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The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolution 
tabled pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure to the Political Affairs 
Committee as the committee responsible: 
- on 26 September 1979, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Druon and 
others on Community armaments procurement programmes within the framework 
of industrial policy (Doe. 1-340/79>; 
- on 26 September 1979, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Jaquet and 
others on Community armaments procurement programmes within the framework 
of industrial policy (Doe. 1-350/79>; 
- on 26 September 1979,the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Marchais 
and others on Community armaments procurement programmes within the 
framework of industrial policy (Doe. 1-352/79>; 
- on 27 September 1979, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Fergusson 
and others on Community armaments procurement programmes within the 
framework of industrial policy <Doe. 1-357/79>; : 
- on 21 May 1980, the motion for a resolution tabl~d by Mr Ghergo and others 
on the protection of the civilian population against possible attacks by 
atomic, chemical or bacteriological weapons (Doe;. 1-169/80/rev.>; 
On 4 May 1981, the European Parliament authorized the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection to draw up an opinion 
on this motion for a resolution. 
- on 26 June 1980, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Lomas and others 
on arms sales to third world countries <Doe. 1-262/80>; 
- on 6 July 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Vandemeulebroucke 
on the supply of Belgian military equipment to Uruguay (doe. 1-354/81>; 
- on 17 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Ms Clwyd on the 
use and production of chemical weapons <Doe. 1-1026/81>; 
- on 16 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson and 
others on the need to provide better civil defence for the peoples of Europe 
<Doe. 1-356/82>. 
This motion for a resolution was also referred to the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection for its opinions. 
- on 15 December 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Vandemeulebroucke 
on the arms trade (Doe. 1-1017/82); 
- on 16 December 1982 the motion for a resolution tabled by Sir Peter Vanneck 
and Mr Fergusson on cooperation between the Assembly of the Western European 
Union and the European Parliament (Doe. 1-1050/82). 
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At its meeting of 18 and 19 December 1979, the Political Affairs 
Committee decided to draw up a report on: 
I 
- armaments procurement within a common industrial policy, 
- sales of arms, 
- institutional matters, 
- protection of the peoples of the European Community against atomic, bacteriological 
and chemical weapons. 
On 23 January 1980, Mr Fergusson was appointed rapporteur. 
The European Parliament authorized: 
- on 11 October 1982, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
- on 10 January 1983, the Committee on External Economic Relations 
to draw up an opinion on this report. 
The Political Affairs Committee considered an initial draft report on these 
matters at its meeting of 19 and 20 October 1982. 
At its meeting of 29-30 November and 1 December 1982, it decided to submit 
a report on the first two items mentioned above namely arms procurement within 
a common industrial policy and arms sales. 
This draft report was considered at the meetings of 19-21 January 1983, 
14-16 March 1983 and 13-14 June 1983. At the last of these meetings the motion 
for a resolution as a whole was adopted by 21 votes to 13. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Beyer de Ryke 
(deputizing for Mr Haagerup), Mr Bournias, Mr Calvez (deputizing for Mr Donnez>, 
Mrs Charzat (deputizing for Mr Jaquet), Mr De Pasquale (deputizing for 
Mr Pajetta), Mr Deschamps, Mr Gawronski <deputizing for Mr Berkhouwer), 
Mrs Gredal, Mr Habsburg, Mr H~nsch, Mr Hammerich, Lord Harmar-Nicholls (deputizing 
for Lord O'Hagan), Mr von Hassel, Mr van den Heuvel, Mr Klepsch, Mr Lalor, 
Mrs Lenz, Mr Ligios (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Macario (deputizing for 
Mr Penders), Mr de la Malene, Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Lord Bethell), 
Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Piquet, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Prag (deputizing for Lady Elles>, 
Sir Brandon Rhys Williams (deputizing for Mr Fergusson), Mr Schall, Mr Schieler, 
Mr K. Schtln (deputizing for Mr Barbi), Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Sir Peter Vanneck 
<deputizing for Mr Newton Dunn), Mr Walter and Mr Zagari. 
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The opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
Committee on External Economic Relations are attached; the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection does not intend to deliver 
an opinion. 
This report was submitted on 20 June 1983. 
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52 
59 
A 
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on arms procument within a common industrial policy and arms sales 
The F-uropean Parliament, 
- having regard to the following motions for resolution: 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr DRUON and others, on Community 
armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial policy 
(Doe. 1-340/79); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr JAQUET and others, on Community 
armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial policy 
<Doe. 1-350/79>; 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr MARCHAIS and others, on Community 
armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial policy 
<Doe. 1-352/79>; 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr FERGUSSON and others, on Community 
armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial policy 
<Doe. 1-357/79); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ghergo and others, on the protection 
of the civilian population against possible attacks by atomic, chemical and 
bacteriological weapons <Doe. 1-169/80/rev.); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others, on arms sales 
to third world countries (Doe. 1-262/80>; 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBROUCKE on the supply of 
Belgian military equipment to Uruguay (Doe. 1-354/81); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Ms CLWYD concerning the use and 
production of chemical weapons (Doe. 1-1026/81); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'ORMESSON and others, on the 
need to provide better civil defence for the peoples of Europe (Doe. 1~356/82); 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBROUCKE on the ar~s trade 
<Doe. 1-1017/82>; 
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Sir Peter VANNECK and Mr FERGUSSON 
on cooperation between the Assembly of the.Western Europea~ Union and the 
European Parliament <Doe. 1-1050/82), 
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-having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and to the 
opiniow: ol the Committee cm lconomic: and Monct..ary Affairs and the Committee 
on Economic and External Relations (Doe. 1-455/83), 
(I) 
A. recalling its resolution of 14 June 1978 on European armaments procurement1; 
B. recalling the Greenwood report on a policy for promoting defence technology 
cooperation among Western European countries, transmitted to Parliament by 
the Commission in December 1980; 
C. noting the results achieved by the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG) concerning armaments production cooperation; 
D. noting that defence purchasing is the single most important field where action 
is required to ensure that European industries, especially in the area of 
information technology, shall be able not only to compete with US and 
Japanese firms but shall also be able to strengthen Europe's own defen~e 
capability; 
Calls upon the Council, as concerns conventional armaments procurement within a 
common industrial policy 
1. To encourage Member governments taking part in the work of the IEPG to give 
its Panel I - concerned with equipment planning - the functions of a European 
Defence Analysis Bureau which would serve as a clearing house for information 
on defence needs and military production capabilities, identifying collaborative 
procurement possibilities and analysing the options available; 
2. To approve the eighty directives that relate to the internal market and to 
technical barriers to trade; 
3. To urge those Member governments taking part in the work of the IEPG: 
1 
(a) to replace bilateral Memoranda of Und~rstanding between the individual 
members of the Atlantic Alliance by Memoranda in which the European 
participants act collectively vis-a-vis the us and Canada; 
(b) to develop dual production programmes, under which European consortia would 
produce US-designed equipment and the US would produce European designed 
equipment, through the enlargement of the present IEPG list of sets of 
equipment suitable for production in this way; 
and 
KLEPSCH report <Doe. 83/78), OJ No. C 163,, 10.7.1978 
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(c) to attempt to reach an agreement between the US and the IEPG aimed at 
the devclopmrn1 of typr~ and group$ of weapon~, which together with the 
points suggested above, would strengthen the so-called triad approach; 
tflla upon the Commission, as concerns the same subject 
1. to ensure that the market for all defence contractors operates 
smoothly by 
a> extending the principle of the Second Supplies direc~ive, relating 
to public procurement, into the defence contracts field; 
b) removing the many barriers to trade resulting from differing 
standards and from national testing and certification procedures; 
c> continuing to put forward proposals and securing agreement on 
measures to improve the operation of the internal market; 
2. to continue its work on fundamental research and development in the 
Joint Research Council having particular regard to the requirements of 
the defence sector, as defined by the lEPG, as well as to those of 
Europe's overall technological base, viz. ESPRIT <European Strategic 
Programme of Research on Information Technology>; 
3. to increase i!_s_efforts towards joint European research in areas 
involving a particularly large degree of innovation; 
4. to carry out research into the areas of technology which could most 
usefully be develop~d in Western Europe, possibly also in cooperation 
with Japan and the USA; 
s. to develop a programme concerning computer-aided design and manufacturing 
systems and artificial intelligence; 
6. to promote research, financed by the Community, into the development 
of advanced software, and to investigate ways and means of bringing 
together companies from different Community countries in collaborative 
research and development projects; 
\ 7. to report annually, in writing, to the European Parliament on the ~ction 
taken to implement this resolution. 
0 
0 0 
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(11) 
A. conaidering the continuing difference• between the national arm1 sales 
policies of the Member States of the European Community; 
a. considering the need for the Member States of the European Community to 
agree on fundamental principles governing their arms exports to third 
count des; 
c. recognizing that arms sales policies pursued individually by some Member 
States without regard to the common interest or the interests and policies 
of oth•rs may lead to instability or war elsewhere i~ the world; 
D. believing that competitive ar•s sales outside the Alliance could 
be limited to those polit1cally desirable or justifiable if a 
coherent Community procurement policy were established; 
e. r.ecognising that arms sold by Member States have, in some cases been 
~sed for aggressive and oppressive purposes; 
F. recognising the enormous economic cost and the dangers to security 
caused by competitions to acquire armaments in the Middle East, 
~ 
Latin America, Asia and Africa, where local conflicts are sometimes 
exacerbated by super-power intervention and promoted by competitive 
arms sales; 
Calls upon the Council, at the level of the Ministers of Defence and otherwise, 
as concerns arms sales 
1. to establish rules governing the export of arms from Member States to 
third countries; 
2. to agree on the restrictions to be placed on the export to ce~tain 
third countries of specified types of arms; 
3. to keep these restrictions continually under review. 
·. 0 
0 0 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Community Member States meeting in political 
cooperation and to the Council and to the Com.ission. 
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I EXPIJ',NA'l'ORY STATEMENT 
I. Armaments Procurement within a Common Industrial Policy 
1. on 14 June 1978 the European Parliament adopted a resolution accom-
panying the Klepsch report, on European Armaments Procurement, which 
called •on the Commis•ion to •ubmit to the council in the near future a 
European action pr~gramme for the developmftnt and production of conv~n­
tional armaments within the framework of a common industrial policy.'' 
2. In response to Parliament's resolution and the Klepsch report, the 
Commission asked the Director of the Centre for Defence studies at 
Aberdeen, Mr Oavid Greenwood, to prepare a report on a policy for promo-
ting defence technological cooperation among West European countries. 
This report was transmitted to the European Parliament by the Commissioner, 
Viscount Davignon, in December 1980 with a covering note on industrial 
policy and defence matters. 
3. The Greenwood report took the Klepsch report as its starting point, 
then analysea the general problem of armaments procurement cooperation and 
concluded with a number of proposals. Its underlying philosophy is that 
"rather than striving to devise elaborately integrated arrangements for 
the demand and supply sides of the European defence market, the policy 
emphasis should be on formally separate but concerted efforts to obtain 
the military and industrial benefits sought". 
4. One of its main conclusions is that there is a reasonably close 
correlation between the defence purchases of the Nine and their output 
or sales. Quoting from a previous study of which Mr Greenwood was co-author 
the report considers that : "If the aggregate demand were coordinated ... 
and the research, development and manufacturing capacities which constitute 
the EEC production potential could be similarly coordinated, military 
needs might be satisfied more efficiently and more effectively (or bo:h) ". 
As opposed to the "grand institutional innovation approach" of th,~ l<lepsch 
report, the Greenwood report proposed two alternatives. One was th~ 
pursuit of •separate but concerted" moves towards the desired ends. T~n 
other was to attempt modest institutional innovation, evolutionary rath c 
than radical in character. According to Greenwood, the most useful actions 
to promote the necessary military/industrial developments would be based 
on (a) greater and more systematic encouragement of case-by-case collabo-
ration in defence procurement and production; and (b) more energetic 
exploitation of public contracts to promote in the EEC a sound and balanced 
structure of high technology industries. 
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S) The Greenwood report eonclu!t!ill that't'llfere"are two main 
., -~tf«•C, 
i nstitutiona.l 
requirements 
(l) a Enropea.n l>f'fence Ana.lyeie Bureau. 'l'hi El wonJd ~erve as a 
rlcu\ritHJ htnt .. fl f('\t' infnrruat-if'ln 011 l'l~l'rrwn tlb~>'d~: tuHI military 
productivo capabilities. lt would help to identify collabora-
tive procurAment possibiUtJes, and would independently analyse 
the options open. 
(2) A Europea.h Public Procurement Task Force. Thi~: would contrive 
the most effective use of Governments' purchasing power in civil 
and military matters in order to maintain and sustain a high 
technology base. 
6) Greenwood defines the purpose of the former of these bodies as being 
to make sure that, in the defence field, Mno opportunity for cooperative 
procurement goes 'lnidentified and no collaborative programme option is 
rejeeted on the basis of merely intuitive or impressionistic assessment 
of its merits." The aim of the latter "would be to define the arrange-
ments necessary to ensure that with the furtherance of industrial policy 
objectives in mind, no civil or military public procurement ehoice is made 
without explicit attention to those objeetives." 
7) It is somewhat suprising that the Greenwood report rejects two'of the 
main aims underlying the Klepsch report : the reduction of financial waste 
.. 
caused by overlapping research and development costs; and the achievement 
of greater military efficiency in trying to rationalise or make inter-
operable the very varied types of equipment used by the armed forces of 
European stat.~..s and by Canada and the United States. 
8) In a speech made at St. Andrew's University on 14 May 1981, 
Mr Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission, set out a number of 
suggestions which complemented the Klepsch and Greenwood reports. In 
particular Mr Tugendhat suggested that within Community industrial policy 
aa a whole (not merely that of arms procurement) : "There is considerable 
seep~ for the procurement programmes of the ten governments to be esta-
blished on the basis of common criteria with complementary objectives and 
open to companies from all Member States. Obviously they would not all be 
the same. Their scale and interests are too diverse. But they should be 
designed and regulated in such a way as to secure benefits for the indus-
tries concerned on a Europe-wide basis. The aehievement of this aim will 
require careful negotiation as each Member State must feel that in opening 
up its own market it is securing commensurate opportunities for its 
national eompanies in others." 
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9) In an outspoken passage of his sp<!ech Mr Tugendhat stated : "ThE' 
community has n:.•Hp<JnRibi lities in lh•:> .i nJuu ( d" t firld, r~..n· tl 1\(1111)11 £' l.>ll 
industrial policy generdlly, on state a:lda to industry, and 011 research 
in certain areau O( high technology. The Commission has within its 
services a supply of expertise and experience in some of these areas. 
Could not this expertise and these responsibilities be of relevance to 
European cooperation in the defence industries as well as in the civil 
industries? 
10) "Governments and parliaments rightly look to the Commission to be 
active in the industrial field. If we are to develop European industry, 
particularly the modern high technology industries, on a Community-wide 
basis in order to be able to hold our own against American and Japanese 
competition, then we must accept that the defence and defence-related 
industries will be involved as well. We cannot draw an artificial line 
between the civilian and defence industrial sectors". 
11) Mr Tugendhat concluded : "If ••• we succeed in restructuring the 
budget to reflect the new priorities of the 1980's, and if we can put into 
effect commo.n policies for maintaining Europe's ind.ustrial competitivity, 
then there may well be gains in terms of cost effectiveness and rationali-
sation in the defence field too •••• we need to accept that there is a 
Community dimension to Europe's defence, ~articularly defence industrial 
problems, and we should not allow preconceived institutional constraints 
to prevent us from seeking the most cost-effective and politically natural 
means of tackling them." 
a) The Independent European Programme Group 
12} These remarks are highly relevant to the latest developments in 
armaments procurement within the Western world - particularly to moves 
within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and to the growing 
possibility of the entry of Japanese industry into defence technology. 
13) Because it took the IEPG some time to achieve a series of break-
throughs concerning arms procurement cooperation, it became fashionable, 
in political and academic circles, to write it off as ineffective. This 
dismissive attitude was mistaken. Against the proposition that the IEPG 
can only become a vital force in arms procurement if it is institutionalised 
and given a permanent secretariat, must be set the new and growing coopera-
tive relationship between European states and the USA pionf:'ered by the IEPI~. 
r 11- PE 78. 344,/·fin. 
14) In the cC'ntext of th"i! trans-atlantic relationship, to which the 
I<lepsch repor:- .:~.ttached such importance, the JEPG started, in 1978, a 
dialogue with the USA. This covered in the first place work on the 
abolition of institutional obstacles to~cooperation and eo-production. 
More positively, it embraced " "triad approach" which consists of : 
(a) work on bilateral Memoranda uf Understanding (MOU's) between all IEPG 
count ries1 and the United States and Canada; (b) d11al product ion programmes, 
under which European consortia would produce·U.S. designed equipment, and 
the u.s. would, in turn, produce European-designed equipmen~2 ; (c) "Families 
of weapons" under which u. S. and European partners would undertake the 
development of separate items within an agreed "family" of related equip-
ment. 
15) Within the framework of the triad approach the u.s. presented a 
list of 16 items of equipment to the members of the IEPG in 1978. The list 
has since grown to the 18 items set out in Appendix I. Most of them competed 
with systems under development or in production in Europe and have not 
therefore been taken up; IEPG project groups have been established in four 
cases- AIM 9-L (which is now being produced), M-483, STINGER and ~VERICK 'D'. 
Of greater significance, in the terms of reference of the present report, 
the members of the IEPG decided, in July/August 1981, on an initial list of 
8 sets of equipment that could be produced under dual production programmes. 
16) Each of these systems involve collaboration between two or more IEPG 
members and are either in or about to enter production in Europe. qowever, 
the latter list is only a starting point : it is confidently expected , 
within the IEPG, that furtner items of equipment can be added to it within 
the near future as equipment now at the R & D stage approaches production. 
The items on the IEPG list are not yet public. The IEPG countries consider 
that whereas the u.s. could .. purchase and produce some European-designed 
equipment for their home~b•·sed forces, they could also buy additional items 
for u~e by their armed forces in Europe. 
17) The real breakthrough made by the IEPG in establishing its expandable 
first list is that agreements have been hammered out between rival govern-
ments representing competing industrial firms over the manufacture and sal·es 
1 
2 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembo~rg, the 
Netherlands, Norwa-y, Portugal, Turkey, United J<ingdom. 
European production of u.s. equipment and U.S. production of European 
equipment can, in the former case, be more economical than direct 
purchase and can possibly lead to savings in the European R &·D effort. 
The latter case can help to sustain the vitality of the European 
advanced industrial base anc'l redress the imbalance in transatlantic 
defence equipment traffic. 
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of the equipment. Jn c'loing this those p;uropean c.:ounlries involved have 
shown a degree of self-denial and self-discipline which has not charac-
terhed their procurement policies in the past. 
18) The main purpose of the "family·of weapons" idea is to assess types 
of weapons with overlapping tasks so as to share their development between 
the IEPG on one hand and the u.s. and Canada on the other thus avoiding 
duplication of research and development. This does not exclude the poss-
ibility of parallel production of the same equipment in North America and 
in Europe. 
b) The Japanese Factor 
19) The possibility of Japanese entry into defence technology poses a 
new threat to European advanced technology, particularly in the field of 
electronics. At the centre of the potential Japanese threat lies the 
development of 5th generation computers1 . The 5th generation computers 
are planned to be capable of "artificial intelligence" or of being able 
to communicate directly with people. They are planned to be able to accept 
voice commands in any language and to be able to read and interpret abbre-
viations. They are planned also to be able to repair and maintain them-
selves, to operate in secrecy and to thwart computer crime, unauthorised 
use and outside interference. It is supposed that computers of this type 
would have much more efficient memories than existing computers and would 
be capable of operating very much faster. Quite apart from the civil 
application of 5th generation computers, it is clear that the new techno-
logy will have significant military implications, particularly as far as 
aircraft and missile guidance and control goes, and. also in respect of 
electronic warfare. 
20) It is understood that Mr George Keyworth, Chief Scientific Adviser 
to President Reagan, has already asked the Japanese if the United States 
could share their technology for defence purposes. British scientist~ 
have recently visited Japan to study the Japanese 5th generation comput.?r 
programme and have been holding "talks about talks" on possible cooperati Otl. 
Not only should the Community also obviously be represented, as an entity, 
in talks with the Japanese about 5th generation computers; but the Commi-
ssion should ale~ seek to d•velop a possible programme, in cooperation with 
the Japanese, centering on computer aided design and manufacturing systems, 
artificial intelligence and its application, systems analysis and testing 
1 1st generation computers used tubes, 2nd - semi-conductors, 3rd -
integrated circuits and the 4th generation large scale integrated 
circuits. 
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methods and equipment as well aR control mechanisms and procedures. 
21} Further, the Commission should promote joint Community research 
into the developmPnt ot advanced software, as this is the largest single 
co•t component in telematics, ~icro-electLonics and computer systems. It 
could usefully investigate ways and means of funding such research, and of 
bringing companies together in collaborative R & D ventures1 . Moves of 
this type would not cause competition problems si:H:e the firms involved, 
having cooperated on research and development,.would be free to compete 
in the market place in much the same way as Renault, Peugeot and Volvo, 
having developed a jointly produced engine, compete with each other with 
their finished products. 
22) Such action could be taken by the Commission under the general heading 
of innovation policy, on which it has already been at work following the 
go-ahead given by the European Council in December 1980. European priorities 
for research and development at Community level can be fixed by the 
Commission following its evaluation of the Japanese programme. The military 
implications of Japanese advances should also be considered by the most 
appropriate body, which would seem to be the IEPG. Your rapporteur deve-
lops this point in the conclusions to the present chapter. 
23) The Commission might also be called upon to draw up a more general 
report· on Community-wide industrial and commercial cooperation. This could 
assess the barriers to cooperation, establish models for it, and ascertain 
what practical action the Commission could take to foster it. The comm-
ission might consider reviving its proposals for a European Company Statute 
and a European Cooperation Grouping. It would also be useful for the 
Commission to establish the numbers of those employed in "strategic 
industries " together with an assessment of the current employment trends. 
In line with the suggestions made by Mr Tugendhat referred to earlier, the 
Commission could also examine existing policy on public procurement and 
investigate ways of achieving its more effective use and smoother working. 
24) It is necessary here to underline the significance of the defence 
industry for employment. As Mr David Greenwood comments in his report for 
the Commission, although the picture is fairly clear for Britain and France, 
~""''·!•·· ··~ . this is not the case for other Community countries. British and French 
official sources lead the Greenwood study to conclude that employment 
generated directly from domestic defence requirements stands at about 
1 One precedent is the Indu~trial Memorandum of Understanding between 
A6rospatiale, Agusta, MBB and Westland on helicopter production and 
the subsequent DP.claration of Principles signed by the respective 
governments. 
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200,000 jobs :n Bdtc1in -.1nd the same numb<'r in France. Front unofficial 
sources Ml· Cc· f:!nwovd suqgcst:s that the figure for Germany 1s about. the 
Aame. In Rri·:ain approximately another 200,000 are employed on sub-
contracl~d wo!·k rf"latnlg lo defen~e. Mr Gr(·enwood has e!'itim<lted lhaL 
bnth in Franc•.: and Germany Lhc comparable figure: 1s lOO,OOu for each. 
Mr Greenwood has suggested, on the basis of the si~e of other defence 
equipment budgets, that some 50,000-60,000 persons are directly employed 
on the production of national defence equipment in Italy and a similar 
number, taken together, in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Greece. 
25) All in all, then, even if it is hard to provide preciae figures of 
the number of jobs provided by the defence and defence-related industries 
in the Community, the figures quoted above do give some impression of the 
very important employment implications. 
26) Before setting out any precise conclu3ions concerning armaments 
procurement one or two general points should be made. careful considera-
tion of both the Klepsch proposals and the Greenwood report suggests that 
it would be advisable for the Parliament and the commission to strike a 
balance between the far-reaching proposals of Dr. Klepsch and the modest 
~ la carte approach proposed by Mr Greenwood. If it is true, as Greenwood 
suggests, that the ambitious nature of the Klepsch proposals has not found 
an adequate echo at the leve~ of government, in view of their lack of the 
necessary political will, it is nonetheless true that Dr. Klepsch's gri.lnd 
institutional scheme at least provides the Community with an aim that 
could be valid for tomorrow if not for today. Likewise, although the down 
to earth pragmatism of Greenwood is impressive his approach is not suffi-
ciently dynamic or radical to enable a major breakthrough to be made in 
the field of armaments procurement. Above and beyond this, it is necessary 
to bear in mind the progress that has recently been made within the IEPG, 
which could yet lead to the establishment of a "two-way street" between 
Europe and North America in arms development and sales. 
27) Some particularly appropriate comments were made once more by 
Mr Christopher Tugendhat, Vice-President of the commission, at the 
"Gesellschaft fl1r Auswlrtige Politik" at Bonn on 20 October 1981. 
( 
' Mr Tugendhat referred there to the development of the Community in general, 
and not s~ecifipal1y to arms procurements policy; but the sense of his 
remarks remains valid in the context of this chapter. ne said : "Tn the 
short-term, ·~urope A la carte' has attractions, especially for impatient 
heads of government, anxious to see quick results or to avoid difficulties 
at home. It means that those Member States which want to work together on 
something and are ready to do so can move ahead without waiting for others. 
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By the same token those which have difficulty in doing so can opt out. 
Bow much easi~r it all sounds than the endless negotiations that at present 
attend the birth and implementation of Community policies. But in the 
longer term, and not very loilg at that, such an approach would destroy the 
whole Community ideal.· lf the Memb&r States become free t.o choose which 
policiea to participate in and which not, they will soon join in only thoae 
from Which they expect to derive tangible benefits. By the same token 
tovernment• will inc~eaaingly tend only to work with thoee o£ their partners 
with whom cooperation is easy and not with the rest. The concept of working, 
negotiating and conciliating together to widen the area of common activity 
and range of common purpoaea will die. As it doea eo the Community will 
diaintegrate into a collect~n of overlapping inter-state relationships. 
Aa auch it could provide neither the framework for common internal action 
hor the baaia for external initiative• that the f~unding fathers envisaged 
and the tiaea demand." 
28) If the step by step approach of the Greenwood report may be regarded 
aa a corrective to the ambitious institutional design of the Klepsch report, 
eo, in turn Mr Tugendhat'a remarks place the Greenwood report in a wider and 
eore communautaire context. 
PROPOSAL§ 
29) The following proposals might form the basis of a draft resolution: 
1 
(a) The public pro~urement programmes of the Ten governments must be 
eatablished on the ba·•is of common criteria and thrown open to 
companies from all Member States. This would enable public 
contracts to be exploited to ensure the eatabliahment of a sound 
ana balanced structure for high technology industries throughout 
l the Co111111unity • 
(b) The European Def•nce Analysis Bureau proposed by the Greenwood 
report ahould, in effect, take the form of the further develop-
'·• .. nt of panel t of the IEPG - preferably with a 81aall permanent 
-sec::retariat being provided for it. 
(c) '111• Greenwood report also proposed a European Public Procurement 
iask Porce to devise a policy for the moat effective use of 
governments' purchasing power - for civil and military production-
aimed at maintaining and sustaining a high technology industrial 
base. The Conniasion might be the body beat equipped to undertake 
This proposal would seem Lo accord with the conclusions of the European 
Council at its meeting of March 1982, when the President stressed the 
need for industrial strategies as well as policies on advanced technology 
and innovation. 
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this task. This further modification of the Greenwood proposals 
would avoid the creation of additional institutions. 
(d) IEPl1 governments should do everything within thf!i' powe~r quickly 
to develop further the triad approach, as explained above. ln 
particular, thought could bu gi.veu t.o the replac.:emcmt of bilateral 
Memoranda of Understanding by Memoranda of Understandin9 in which 
the European participants act collectively vie-~-vis the United 
States and Canada. 
(e) The useful start that has already been made on dual production 
programmes. should be rapidly developed through the enlargement 
of the present IEPG list of eight sets of equipment. 
(f) Likewise, it would be useful for the United States and its 
European partners to agree on more "families of weapons". 
(g) Within both the IEPG and the Commission studies should now be 
made listing (a) the types of technology which we should try to 
promote in Western Europe and (b) the types of technology in 
which it would make sense for Europe to collaborate. with the USA. 
II. Arms Sales to Third Countries 
30. The sale of conventional arms to countries outside the Community by 
Member States with significant armaments industries is a matter of conti-
nuing controversy. The trade causes both political and commercial diffi-
culties between Member States and with their Allies, while its morality is.a 
vexed question with which the Community has not come to terms. 
31. The Community has no comm6n policy on the supply of arms to third 
countries, such as might or should automatically follow arly agreed common 
foreign policy towards a particular country, region or problem. The absrnce 
of a common arms sales policy is perhaps most notable in areas of endemic 
tension - such as the Middle East, the Gulf, Southern Africa, and Central 
America. In these secto·rs, antagonists may frequently bl!' found to have 
arms supplied by different Member States; while, on occasion, one Member 
State may be discovered to have supplied both sides. 
32. Any cynicism which this state of affairs may induce deserves to be 
moderated in the light of two considerations. The first is that, in the 
absence of a common procurement policy, external sales of arms can be an 
important, even vital, means of meeting the costs of national defence. 
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The second is that where countries and regions have been deliberately des-
tabilised by a~ms s•.1pplied by third countries the transfer of arms is often 
a political nece~sity for the restoration and maintenance of stability. 
The perennial e..cculpation, "If we don't sell arms, others will", has its 
own grim logic, especii:!ll~, whPI'\ so W~ny producers and clients are in the 
game. Whereas in many cases (including "pariah" nations) arms embargoes 
have promoted the growth of indigenous atrns inrln!"itdes, l!leveral of th,. 
newly industrialised countries, notably Sou~h Korea, Brazil and Israel, 
are seeking arms export markets. However, merely because producer countriel 
operate their arms ~rade under a variety of principles, there is no just-
ification for not examining how a common Community policy might de devised. 
Clearly this would have to take account of the attitudes of the other major 
principals in this field, notably the US and the Soviet Bloc. 
a) Arms Sales by Member States 
33: In 1980 ~11 Nine Member States were recorded by the Commission as 
having exported a quantity of arms and ammunition. The figures, however, 
related to "declared trade", and excluded transactions regarded as confi-
dential and whose value and volume have not been disclosed. 
34. Of this declared trade, the states with the three·largest export 
figures in value were Italy, Germany and the Netherlands; in terms of volume 
of total exports, Italy and the Netherlands and Denmark, the only countries 
for whom such arms represented more than one percent of the total trade. 
~. Since tre total of declared trade for 1980 for the entire EEC amounted 
to only 391,039,000 EUA, it is evident that these figures are of limited 
significance. 
36. The SIPRI figures for exports to the Third World during the 1970's 
give a better overall picture. They place (after-the us and USSR) France, 
Britain, Italy and Germany in that order among the major arms exporters to 
the Third World. It is evident from the tables annexed (see Annex II) that 
the arms exports of China, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Sweden are 
not negligible. The EEC total is considerably less than Russia's exports, 
and only half of the Unjted States'. France's total makes up nearly half of 
all Community exports, and Britai~'a nearly one-quarter. 
b) Sales Policies Followed b_y_ Member States 
37. The principal manufacturing and exporting EEC countries are France, 
the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The following notes 
are selective, wit~. different aspects of each country's approach being 
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highlighted, not in order to emphasise contrasts, but in order to illus-
trate particular points. 
38. In defence matters the most determinedly independent of the Western 
Allies, France may argue a greater need than most to augment through arms 
sales its policies of loyalty to its friends and determination to be self-
reliant in defence. 
39. In September, 1981, the Prime Minister, Mr Mauroy, told the Institut 
des Hautes Etudes de la D~fence Nationale (IHEDN): "France intends to remain 
faithful to her allies, amongst the foremost of which are the United States 
••• the policy of France is in no way neutra~ist ••• Aggression against 
France does not merely start when the enemy invades her own national terr-
itory ••• Faithful to her alliances, conscious of forming part of the 
European geographical area, France means to remain independent in her choices 
and decisions in military policy, the last recourse of foreign policy. 
France's nuclear deterrent constitutes the basis of her automomy of decision." 
' 40. Nuclear independence is echoed at the conventional level, which accounts 
for the fact that during the seventies France's arms exports to the Third 
World constituted 10 percent of all such sales- twice as large as Britain's 
share. As Mr Mitterrand said in an interview in September 1981 : "The French 
army would not possess such modern equipment if the French armaments industry 
had to depend only on its own national market ••• If France were to abandon 
her overseas markets someone else would take her place - America, Russia or 
one among many others. " 
41. However, a month later, the French Minister of Defence, Mr Hernu, 
saying that he was examining the policy of arms sales, laid down the following 
principles: 
(1) Past agreements would be respected, except in the case uf 
"equipment for land forces sold to Chile". UN Resolution 418 
regarding South Africa would also be observed. 
(2) The ·moral aspect of arms sales would be considered. In parti-
cular, the possibility that military material might be used 
to suppress popular movements would be taken into account. 
(3) New approaches would take account of what arms exports would 
contribute to the cost effectiveness of equipping France's 
own forces, to industrial employment and to diplomatic actj-
vity, "in the service of the principles of the independence 
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(4) 
and the sovereignty of states." 
Sales operations taken in cooperation with other democratic 
States should be examined 0111 a matter of priority, with due 
regard to the •~verei~nty cf each partner. 
42. Mr Mauroy (op.cit.) summetl it up thus 
"France, to be sur~, has no vocation \:o be au arms eal,..sman. But 
Prance cannot decide to refuse to export military equipment ••• The extension 
of the international presence of our armaments industry results, in the 
first place, and let us not forget it, from the independence of France. 
Within this framework, the government has nonetheless decided, whilst ros-
pe~ting scrupulously the contracts it has signed, not to deliver military 
equipment to countries which do not respect the most elementary human rights." 
43. The French arms industry, according th SIPRI, emplcys 300,000 people. 
The United Kingdom 
44. The United Kingdom Government appears to observe only two criteria 
in limiting arms sales - beyond the observance of the list drawn up by the 
allied co-ordination committee (COCOM). The first covers armaments that 
can be u~ed for internal repression by regimes of which the government dis-
approves: that is, grenades, rifles, armoured cars and the like. The second 
covers armaments that might be used against the UK or against her allies in 
a wider conflict. Periodically, the UK government comes under domestic and 
external criticism for permitting sales to certain countries (especially 
those with Right-wing governments) • It does not indulge itself in an overall 
philosophical approach to the matter. 
45. This somewhat loose attitude to arms sales policy may well be reviewed 
in the light of the crisis on the South Atlantic in the Spring of 1982. 
West Germany 
46. The policy of the West German government was described early in 1981 
by the Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher, in these words : "Arms export policy 
can be an instrument for safeguarding our security and energy interests. 
Stability may be increased in an area of tension by providing a country with 
the means to defend itself. After all, if one side is much stronger than 
the other the effect is destabilising - and we must consider the fact that 
the Soviet Union's worldwide effort to gain power creates worldwide tension." 
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51. By thP. !lame token, the White PapP.r pointed out that purchaser 
countrie:1 u"l.itl .. J confidenC'e in rtalilm industry frorct the kno>t.'ledge that the 
1 talian a nnt•d ~orces used those same weapons. 
52. Ir. the spring of 1981 the Dutch government came undE>r all-party 
pressure to release details of arms exports, which had ri~en markedly to 
a level of Fl.SOOm (£lOOm) in 1979 from about a quarter of that sum the 
year before. Th~ government had recently approved export permits for two 
submarines fo1 •raiwan and six Fo'k'ker F-27s to .Bolivia. 
53. The F·oreign Minister made two points which indicated his country's 
approach to arms sales to third countries: first, that he would only 
c~nsider providing information to Parliament on a confidential basis; second, 
that the Nether·lands did not consider arms sales to be part of foreign policy. 
54. Li'ke other Member States, the Netherlands approaches sales on an ad hoc 
basis, perhaps to ban exports to areas of tension or potential tension, and to 
countries with poor records in human rights. 
Belgium 
5 c;. An excerpt from the newly published "Global Politics of Arms Sales" 
~· Andrew J" Pi~rre (Princeton, 1982) reads as follows: 
"Belgium, which manufactures chiefly light arms, grenades, mines 
and machine guns, is noteworthy because it exports 95 percent of its pro-
duction. Its small arms are to be found throughout the world and are of 
a type that can easily be smuggled into strife-torn countries, such as 
Lebanon. Belgium has perhaps the least restrictive policy of all nations, 
yet ..• its exports remain comparatively small, only 10 percent of those 
of France," 
c) EEC Arms Expor1s Compared with Other Suppliers 
56. The SIPRI Yearboo'k of 1980 noted that two-thirds of the international 
trade in major armaments involve transfers from the industrialised world to 
the Third World. The arms buainesa has been one of the fastest growing 
sectors of the world economy for some time now, with total military equipment 
production of all types now amounting to over $120,000m. 
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47. "As far as Germany is concet·ned, arms deli Vt!ries to the Middle East 
must also take into consideration the particular significance of Israel's 
security interests and our hi stnrica 1 responsibility towards the Jewish 
people." 
48. Herr Genscher added that he wished evcr.y country had as cautious an 
export policy as Germany, and noted that a German initiative at the UN had 
urged the setting up of an arms export register. 
49. This modesty is not entirely recognised by others. A US Congressional 
study released at the beginning of 1982 (by the General Accounting Office, 
congress Investigative Agency) describes West Germany as a major seller of 
arms, and notes that 40 percent of her sales have been to countries which 
the us refused to supply because they were adversaries of tsrael. Between 
1973 and mid 1978, says the study, these particular sales amounted to 
US$ l,080m, including in 1977 $ 240m of anti-tank missiles to Syria. Another 
20 percent of West Germany's sales went to La~in America: the study says 
that 625 million of the 862 million dollars in recent sales in that region 
were to countries to whom the US would not sell. In 1975/79, German deli-
veries have been to Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and venezvela. 
In annual amounts West German exports had risen from $ 200m in 1971 to $ 800m 
in 1977 (compared with us figures of $ 4.7bn and $ 6.5bn, all at 1976 values). 
'lhe study adds that "their low level of sophistication shows a deliberate 
effort to minimise the break with [west Germany's] own policy". Cuts in 
German defence spending programmes are, as elsewhere, likely to increase 
pressure to extend foreign sales. 
50. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade issues licences for military 
exports to such industries as request them, but requires the approval of 
certain other Ministries first, notably those of Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
51. In the seventies the government openly acknowledged the importance 
of military exports to the defence of the country; and in a White Paper (19-7) 
pointed out the consequent benefits: 
a reduction of the costs for Italy's own armed forces, 
the maintenance of the national industry at a high and 
competitive technological level, even when this level could 
not be guaranteed by the limited national demand, 
a flow of hard currency. 
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57. Although the reality n•mains that· i·hc:> industrialise<] countnes nre 
by far the largest cuRtomerfl for arms, and by far the mont· heavily anoed, 
the Third World is in absolute terms as woll as in terms of E~ophi st.ica.tion, 
buying more and more. So long as the arms are available, it is cheaper for 
them than developing their own arms industries would be. 
58. The three largest sources of supply are the US, the Soviet Union 
and the Community, in that order. In the seventies, the us exported 
45 percent of the total to the Third World; the USSR 27.5 percent; and the 
EEC about 23 percent (of which France 10, UK 5, Italy 3, W. Germany 2.3 
percent). SIPRI reckons that there are 43 "major arms exporters" in the 
world. About 24 developing countries produce arms of one type or another, 
mostly under licence. Yet the US, USSR and EEC account for all but a tiny 
proportion of all manufactures. 
United States 
59. US arms aid and exports have been subject to much criticism in other 
countries. In practice, American policy is subject also to continual cri-
ticicm at home, in the Senate and Congress, according to what is perceived 
as the best interests of the United States or of their prot~g~s or friends. 
In Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and the Far East there are numerous 
countries in respect of whom an arms embargo is exercised; just as there at:e 
t1thers whose governments the US makes a point of supporting in this matter. 
7.s in the case of the Soviet Union (see below) arms exports are a means for 
influencing events both positively and negatively. As with the Soviets, 
arms exports, especially to the Third World, are small compared with overall 
defence expenditure, in the us about 4 percent of all defence spending. 
Russian exports represent about 5-6 percent of theirs. (On the other hand 
the US claims that two thirds of this spending consists of support and 
services. Soviet customers generally find themselves, too, with a large 
alien military presence to service the weapons they have bought). 
60. In the mid-seventies, two thirds of the US arms sales programme was 
directed to Saudi Arabia, putting a more modest complexion on the sales to 
other clients. As with the USSR, American arms exports policy has moved 
' 
to a commercial basis in recent times. 
Soviet Union 
61. Arms sales are very much an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, 
which may be summarised as aiming at the erosion and replacement of 
-·2J - PE 78.344 /fin. 
Western influence in the Third World; counteracting the Chinese challenge; 
and the prom·.tion of Soviet Communism in the lesser developed countries. 
One of tl•e mo.:~t remarkable contrasts between Soviet and American policies 
towards the 'l'hird Wo1.ld are their respective ratios between military and 
non-military aid. Of the US $ 32,000m spent by Russia (1978 prices) in 
the Third World since 1954, $ 24,000m have heen "military related". In 
the seventies, the balance was 5 to 2 in favour of arms. Military trans-
fers have brought prestige with them; and the military weh has quickly 
~ntangled those regimes whose survival depended on it. 
62. Unlike Soviet economic or project aid, arms have generally been 
rapidly proviced - in the past, at discounts of from 40 to 75 percent, 
repayable at 2 percent interest or in commodities needed by Russia. 
63. Currently, the largest share of Russian military exports goes to 
thP. Middle East and Africa - notably Libya, Syria, Iraq and Ethiopia. 
Since the sixties, arms sales have assumed commercial importance, because 
of the ability of OPEC countries to pay for them. Sales doubled between 
1969/73 and 1974/78. Libya has been the largest buyer since 1973. 
64. Peru seems to be the only Latin American governmental customer for 
Soviet arms at first hand (most recently of S22 fighter bombers) • It is 
known that subsidies and subventions to support the Castro regime in Cuba 
cost over S l,OOOm a year on oil alone in 1980; but there are no figures 
for the amount paid in hard currency and the amount of military equipment 
provided for Cuban adventures and support for revolutionary movements in 
Africa and Latin America. 
65. In 1977/78, 30 percent of total Soviet arms sales went to Ethiopia, 
and 55 percent to Libya, Algeria, Syria and India - totalling about $ 4,000m 
per annum. The balance went to Afghanistan, South Yemen, Iraq, Tanzania an~ 
Per~. By then, military hardware had become the Soviet Union's most impor-
tant export to the Third World. 
66. It is true that there were two exceptional non-military assistance 
programmes in 1978 (the $ 2,000m Moroccan phosphate deal which guarantees 
Russia l0m tons a year for 30 years; and the $ l,200m deal with Turkey). 
But, bearing in mind the unknown amount of military and other aid poured 
into Vietnam, set against these sums, it is apparent that at present more 
than three quarters of Soviet assistance to the Third World is military, 
and that, of the rest, more than three quarters goes to Cuba, an overtly 
militarist state. 
- 24- PE 78. 344/fin. 
i. I I 11 • ;;:w o,z OQ Jll;a :WW, 11!, 
67. It cannot be the purpose of this chapter to attempt to solve the 
moral dilemma in which arms suppliers find themselves. As the above notes 
on ;:u-ma !!!ctlE'e polil~i<"EI show, there lltP. many renoour:; and mAny mol1Vflf.1 l•rhin1l 
th~ lraue: and no Statt- has 1.1 monopoly or rectitude or blame. 
68. What is quite clear is that, if a few states - or the EEC itself -
were to withdraw their products from the world market, there would certainly 
be enough suppliers left to enjoy even more profitable business and yet to 
give the buyers enough freedom of choice to prevent their becoming danger-
ously dependent on any one source. If the Community were to withdraw it 
would presumably reduce ou~ ability to counteract destabilisation wherever 
it occurs. 
69. However, the proliferation or arms suppliers, the availability of 
arms, and the poor prospects for organising world-wide control of the arms 
market indicate that the dilemma is not a very concrete one expept in strictly 
ethical terms. The dilemma becomes divisive - for example, in the European 
Parliament - when the supply of arms is linked to making the political choice 
between two regimes nearly equally abhorrent to parliamentarians (as in 
Cambodia or in Central America) • 
70. The dilemma is pharasaic, however, in its assumption that the 
countries of the Third World in general have less va~uable an appreciation 
of what they require for their security than outsiders do. It may be true 
that "increasing arms expenditure by Third World countries reduces the 
resources available to feed, house and care for their people" - but that 
does not make a policy of disarmament in the face of a serious internal or 
external threat a necessarily responsible act of government. Arms may 
increa~e instability: but they may restore balance. The ideal of stability 
and disarmament is unexceptionable: but the one does not always lead auto-
matically to the other. 
71. One resolution tabled in the Parliament called on Member States 
"to curtail arms production and switch resources to socially useful produc1s", 
and "to stop all arms sales to regimes which violate human rights". 
72. Appeals of this kind, however well meant, ignore the complexities of 
the problem. Beating swords into ploughshares (the late prophet Isaiah's 
less prosaic version of the first proposition,[Chapter II, verse 4],repeated 
without acknowledgement by the prophet Micah, [chapter IV, verse 3],) is all 
very well for a nation with no external threat t.o meet or obligation to _f.ul fil. 
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73. As to a~ arms embargo on states wnich violate human rights: which 
countries do .ot:, from time to time, transgress in this Wi.1Y7 Several 
Memb•H Stat•o, aM hn• been point•d out, <5o rent:rain export-"' t-11 countr.ies 
of; whose internal policies they eH aapprove. 
74. However, there is little consistency in a principle which links 
human rights to arms sales but to no other trade which might equally 
support a repressive regime; or which links arms sales tc the infringement 
of human rights but not, for example, to aggression agai~st other states. 
In any case, most Western governments would consider that the degree to 
which human rights are infringed may be set against the desirability of 
maintaining st~bility in the region in question. The states, or their 
clients, who most threaten world stability themselves have far from clean 
records where human rights and democratic practices are concerned. 
e) Towards a Common Arms Sales PolicY 
75. A common sales policy, whether of political, economic or moral 
motivation, appears to be a desirable development to complement the growth 
of a common Community foreign policy through European Political Cooperation. 
76. The clue to how it might come about lies in a paragraph from the 
Dankert Report on Arms Procurement made to Western European Union in 
1977, and quoted in the Klepsch Report to the European Parliament a year 
later :-
"The Committee believes that, together, the European countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance provide an arms market large enough for economic 
production that would be independent of exports to the Third World, thus 
enahling such exports to be terminated or limited to those deemed to be 
in thr interest of Europe according to a commonly defined external policy." 
77. It must be presumed - for this is the tenor of the rest of this 
Report - that a rational arms procurement policy will eliminate the need 
of Community arms manufacturers to look outside the Alliance for their 
survival. Equally, it must be hopPd that the development of a common 
external policy would enable all Community arms sales to third parties to 
be consistent with the goals of world and regional peace and stability. 
78. It would thereafter be expected that Third World countries would 
at least be released from some of the sales pressure and competitive drive 
to which they are naturally at present subject. Consequentially, it mi qht· 
be possible for t11e Community to adopt a detached and mor.e influential 
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position in .respect of lowering tension in sensitive areas of the 
world, and in contriving the rt"duu'l ion - the "de-esc,lLltion" - of 
local conflicts and disputes. The existence of the oligopoly of 
the US, the USSR and the EEC in arms manufacture could be the es-
sential condition for governing the world trade in arms. 
79. Although recently the Dutch government has stated its view 
that arms sales do not form part of Dutch foreign policy, this 
does not mean that for the Community, whether negatively or posi-
tively, they cannot, do not or should not. The subject in due 
course could usefully find its way on to the agenda of the Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation. 
80. Specialisation in European arms manufacture would engender 
the large production runs and economies of scale that could, 
coupled with the development of a structured trans-atlantic arma-
ments market, reduce or eliminate dependence on arms exports out-
side the Atlantic Alliance. A rationalised Community arms indus-
try would make possible the fair sharing of such arms export op-
portunities as the pursuit of joint exports policy dictated. 
f) The Falklands War 
81. The South Atlantic crisis of the spring, 1982, provided 
a case history with a bearing on almost every one of the pro·-
blems of arms sales to third world countries. Argentina had 
bought arms and military equipment in substantial amounts from 
at least six Member States in addition to the United States, 
Switzerland and Israel. 
82. Precise figures are hard to come by and reports var-y. 
However, it seems that from France Argentina obt~ined 3 fri-
gates; 32 Mirages and Super Entendard attack aircraft; 12 
Alouette and Puma helicopters; 30 Lama and Puma transport 
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helicopters; and an uncertain number of assorted missiles, in-
cluding Exocets. From West Germany sl}.e obtained 2 submarines, 
sundry artillery and armoured vehicles. More frigates are i.n 
construction. West Germany is probably Argentino's largest 
supplier. 
83. From Holland she bought her aircraft carrier, the 25th 
of May: which v'aS built in Britain. From Italy she had 18 
Aermacchi and 3 G222 attack aircraft; and 13 Sea King/Agusta 
attack helicopters. 
84. From the United Kingdom, she had bought two destroyers: 
9 Canberra bombers: 2 Lynx helicopters; and a quantity of 
missiles, including Tigercat, Sea Cat and Sea Dart. 
85. The bulk of the Argentine navy is of American origin. 
America also supplied 82 helicopters, 92 Cessnas, 7 Hercules 
transports, and 84 Skyhawks. Israel supplied 26 Dagger Mirages, 
based on the French product, and an assortment of missil~s. 
Argentina also had a fleet of 130 Pucara aeroplanes built domes-
tically and used for internal control as well as in the Falk-
lands battles. 
86. Argentina is a totalitarian state with an appalling 
record in respect of human rights. She also has long-standing 
claims on the territory of Chile as well as on the Falklands. 
It is ~elevant to the determination of any Community arms sales 
policy that the Falklands are the sovereign territory of a 
Member State and associated to the Community by ;m Annex to thf~ 
Treaty. 
87. Both the British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, and the 
British merchant vessel, Atlantic Conveyor, were destroyed 
by Exocet missi.L'..!S, a highly sophisticated weapon against which 
they carried no effective or reliable counter-weapon. 
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The advanced technology of the Exocet, and the fact that the 
Argentine airforce had it at its disposal, may well be of more 
relevance than the sad fact that ships of one Member State were 
attacked and (finolly) sunk by weapons of another: the destroyer 
might have been no less vulnerable to a British missile deployed 
by Argentina. 
88. It is said that 1800 Exocets have been sold by France 
to 23 countries - following corresponding Mirage exports -
including Iran, Pakistan, Peru and Argentina. They are to be 
found especially in Libya, and the Middle and Far East. 
89. Crucial components of the Exocet are manufactured in 
Britain. 
90. At any rate, in the course of the battles over the 
islands, British ships, aircraft and commandos were uttacked 
by aircraft, ships, missiles and other weapons exported to 
Argentina by the Community as well as by other allied or 
friendly nations. Some of these arms were being delivered al-
most up to the eve of the invasion of the islands: there is 
no question (as was the case of Iran) of there having been an 
arms export policy on the part of any Member State which a 
sudden change of regime could have invalidated. 
91. By 1980, Argentina was spending about £280 million a 
year on arms purchases. With rocketing inflation even before 
the invasion, she could perhaps less afford such expenditure, 
especially to undertake such adventures, than any Latin country. 
92. One direct consequence of the invasion was the Community's 
instant agreement on an arms embar-go towards Argentina. Although 
it was an interim arrangement, it could be an important precedent 
for future agreements on sales limitations in respect of arms 
customers. 
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93. It is evident that in this case - in which the Argentine 
regime apparently required to divert the attention of the nation 
from fearsome internal problems (including los desparecidos) -
the capacity to make war led to the reality of the unprovoked 
aggression. 
94. It is also noteworthy that with her Pucara aircraft, which 
were used for the suppression of internal terrorism, Argentina 
had already neveloped a substantial arms industry of her own. 
Israel, another country unprepared to rely on outsiders entirely 
for her security, has equally developed an aircraft indust7y -
and, more significantly, exactly like Member States of the Com-
~unity, is using arms sales to third countries to help meet the 
costs of hec independent defence capability. 
95. Altogether it is evident that, in part because of the 
undiscriminating, uncoordinated and in many respects fecklessly 
competitive arms sa~es policies pursued by many Member States, 
not only was peace in the South Atlantic arena dangerou~ly broken: 
~he territo~y of a Merober State was invaded~ lives of Community 
citizens were lost; and the Community's future good relations 
with Latin America were seriously put at risk. 
96. It must be clear that the sale of arms - however sophis-
ticated, to whatever type of regime - does not of itself cause 
war. It may on rare occasions make it more likely (given the 
political circumstances), just as it may make it less likely. 
It presumably does make it more possible, in that without wea-
pons man is reduced to battling with his fists. 
97. Like many wars in history, the Falklands war seems to 
have been und~rtaken by Argentina through her miscalculation 
of Britain's willingness to resist the seizure of the islands. 
Such miscalcul~•-ions will clearly happen again. In seeking its 
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own security, and in accepting its responsibility - especially 
as an arms exporter - for peace elsewhere in the world, the 
Community must address itself now to the fundamental need for 
a coherent common approach to arms sales. 
98. At the very least, we must ensure that the arms supplied 
to third parties are not on such a scale that we cannot, indi-
vidually or jointly, control any conflict in which they might 
be used. This implies careful discrimination both in respect 
of the customers for Community arms exports and in respect of 
the technological sophistication of the arms and equipment with 
which they are supplied. To sell weapons to which there is, or 
we have, no known counter-weapon, seems to be spitting into the 
wind. 
99. Since the coordination of Community policy in this area 
is fundamental to its success, and since the decisions which 
must guide it are bound to be technical no less than political, 
it seems inevitable that the assembled Defence (or equivalent) 
Ministers of the Member States ought regularly to apply them-
selves to this matter. It is suggested elsewhere that they 
might meet, like the Foreign Ministers, "in political cooperation". 
100. That would appear to be a necessary first step towards 
extending a similar practice throughout the West. 
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LIST OF 18 ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT PRESENTED 
BY 'l'HE U. S • '1'0 '1'BE IEPG 
Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) 
High-Sp.eed, Anti-Radiation Air-to-Surface Missile (HARM) 
Helicopter-Borne Anti-tank Missile with laser Seeker (BELLrtRE) 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) 
Standoff Target Acquisition Systea (SOTAS) 
BLACKHAWK Tactical Transport Helicopter 
VIPER Light, Sho~t-Range Unguided Antitank Rocket 
M-483 lSSmm Cannon Launehed Munitions 
AIM 9-L SIDEWINDER Air~to-Air Misaile 
Forward Lookir.g Infrared Seeker for Miasiles (K>D FLIR) 
PATRIOT Surface-to-Air ~ssile 
STINGER Surface-to-Air Missile 
Tank Ammunition (M-735) 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 
Anti-Per$onnel Mines (M-692/M-731) 
Remote Anti-Armour Mine~ (M-718/M-741) 
MAVERICK 'D' Air-to-Ground Missile 
COPPERHEAD lSSmm cannon Launched Munitions 
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ANNEX II 
~ank order of all major exporters of weapons to the Third World, 1970-79 
Figure~ are SIPRI trend indicator values, as expressed in constant 
us ::; million, at constant 1975 prices. 
Percentage of 
Exporting Third World 
country Total value total 
1. USA 27 727 45 
2. USSR 16 914 27.5 
3. France 5 894 10 
4. UK 3 044 5 
5. Italy 1 868 3 
6; Third World exporters 1 80S 3 
7. FR Germany 1 444 2.3 
8. China 787 1.3 
9. Netherlands 51S 0.8 
10. Australia 421 0. 7 
11. Canada 323 0.5 
12. Sweden 196 0. 3 
13. Czechoslovakia 1S4 0.2 
14. Spain 110 0.2 
15. Poland 80 0.1 
16. Switzerland ss 
17 0 Yugoslavia 47 
18. New Zealand 13 
19. Belgium 5 
20. Japan 3 
Total 61 000 100.0 
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TABLE 2 
WEAPONS DELIVERED TO THE 'l'HI RD WORLD 
BY CATEGORY, 1972-1978 
Unitad 
Equipment Description States u.s.s.R. 
Tanks and self-propelled guns 6,110 8,570 
Artillery 3, 715 6,310 
Armoured cars and personnel carrier• 9~735 6,975 
Major surface combatants . 83 7 
Minor surface combatants 157 94 
Submarines 24 9 
Guided missile boats 0 60 
Supersonic combat aircraft 11,160 1,990 
Subsonic combat aircraft 925 390 
Helicopter~~ 1,730 575 
Other aircraft 1,520 260 
Surface-to-air-missiles (SAMe) 6,240 15,745 
ANNEX 11 
Major 
West 
European 
Nations 
2,090 
955 
2,430 
17 
247 
20 f 
15 
' "355 
35 
1,180 
855 
1,065 
SOURCE: us Congress, Senate, Committee on foreign Relations, Prospects 
for Multilateral Arms Export Re•traint, Staff RepOrt, 96th Cong. 
lst ses•. April 1979,p.ll. · 
TABLE 3 
Exports of arm• and ammunition 
(Chapter 93 Nimexe: January-December 1980) 
" of volume 
Value in of total 
1 000 EUA exports 
FR Germany 98 725 0.07 
France 38 757 0.04 ·' 
Italy 113 557 0.20 
Netherlands 76 602 0.14 
Belgium and Luxembourg 20 467 0.04 
United Kingdom 30 221 0.03 
Ireland 18 0.00 
Denmark 12 692 0.10 
The Nine 391 039 0.08 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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ANNEX II 
TABLE 4 
.. Value of Exports of Weapons to Third World 
(1972-81) 
ri~urc• ar".s1r1u 1n:nd imiM::uur \':tluC's, as c•rrcsscd in US 1 million, ac cnnsa~na (197S) pric~:s: 
A • ).:;.arly n.:urcs, a • ftvc-yc:ar mu\·ina•vcr:a~~s. 
c~uftll')'. 1972 197) 1974 197.5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1911 . .. 
USA' A I 166 I 061 I 4().$ 2)4) lli92 4 8!6 .$1~ 2 ().46 2794 2670 
a, I 214 I 4)1 197) 2 70.5 ) s.u )688 )760 l .SI6 
USSR.• Al I 22S I Sl7 I 930 2160 I .SS4 2156 l68l ) 6)1 3774 2420 
B' i 469 I 673 I 681 I 867 2296 2637 2959 llll 
F~nc:c" 
I 
.S9) .sn I 282 I 236 1179 I 001 I 220 A: l.SI Sll 449 
B. )6) 441 497 68) 112) 908· 992 I 12.5 
ll~ly Ai S2 .56 139 72 IS9 341 SSJ s.a9 .516 )SJ 
B• 66 72 96 ISS 2.54 336 42.5 470 
UK 
I 
.579 647 .S87 .5)6 4KII .an 431 226 ~ 36Q 316 )M 461 . ~nn .5ll .5117 .542 4'19 427 I 
FR Cicrm~ny 1\. n 
' 
1111 DK 1.\l f.O 117 2.10 ~~., 211) 
Bl J" M 
"' 
•JU !Uto 1~'1 IH lf•-1 
Scchcrl:tnds I 27 39 ll 42 1'1 72 6-1 169 IOl S9 ~~ 29 3.5 34 43 48 7.5 S7 : 9) 
China• A IS8 27 104 63 H 66 142 26 73 147 
B liJ 92 ltl 6) 86 71 7J 91 
c~nad~· A 39 6 I 6 34 29 117 28 17 )9 
a: 211 21 17 IS 37 43 .as I 46 
S~o~.cJen A .s I 6 21 21 
' 
I .S .SI 85 Ill 
a· 7 6 11 11 12 21 ~3 33 
I 
Czc:choslo\·alc:.i:a A; 14 I IS 6 6 18 4S 4S 2l 
a· IS 10 8 6 9 IS 23 26 
s ... illcrl3::d A 2 1 • I 8 s 6 2S 23 2.S 
8 2 3 J 4 9 ll 17 
J3='.!n' A l ) , .. 21 
R• 4 7 7 7 
Third \\'mid A Ul :!IJ 27ft- 1115 202 IJ-1 ) 11-1 ))X 24') )MS 
n· 117 lll.l 1.:1) I 11.1 2.111 HI ~~~J )110 
Oc~cr i11Ju\lri:alizcd, \V!!\1 ,\ 11 I'} 11 ll -'6 1112 110 112 :!.7 106 
8 Ill 20 10 .so 68 79 HI 9) 
Oahcr induscri~lized, E:ast A . 2 JO 18 .s 12 46 ll 
B. 6 10 11 17 :!6 27 
Total• A: l.&7l 3617 5 06.& 6304 ,,.1 9699 11165 1585 9350 1036 
B · 3761 .. .&35 5156 6401 1109 I Ill 9411 9561 
---
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ANNFX TII 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-340/79) 
tabled by Mr DRUON, Mr DEBRE, Mr MESSMER, Mr LALOR, Mr NYBORG and Mrs EWING 
on behalf of the Group of European Progressive Democrats 
with request for an early vote pursuant to Rule 47(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
to wind up the debate on Oral Question 1-300/79 
on Community armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial 
policy 
The Assembly of the European Communitie~, 
- whereas none of the provisions of the Treaty l')f Hc.me gives any of th£> 
community bodies competence in matters of defence, 
- whereas not all the Community Member Stat~s. in particular the Repuulic 
of Ireland, belong to NATO or to the Western European Union, 
- whereas within the institutional structure established more than thirty 
years ago as a basis for European union, the European governments expressly 
called for a strict allocation of responsibilities among the var10uo 
trganizations, above all in the secur1ty sector; recalling in thiR 
connection that Article 1, paragraph D of the Statute of the Council IJf 
Europe, adopted in I..ondon on S May 1949, states that matters r('l<ltl.n~ to 
national defence do not fall withln t.he competence of the Council ot 
Europe, 
-whereas, furthermore, it J.S clear from the Trea•.:.· of Brussels of 
17 March 1948 and from the Protocol amending and supplementing this 
Treaty, signed in Paris on 23 October 195-~, that the Western European 
Union, to which seven Member States of t~e Economic Commun1ty belong, 1s 
at present the only European orgilnization within the European J.m~t i tutivnal 
structure whose m.lndatP. covers mattet M of defence and collective S(•cur .i ty 
in F.urope, 
- whereas any attempt by the Assembly of the Europe3n Communitie~ to concern 
itAelf with defence que~tions can only provoke insuperable diffJ.culties 
between the Gov'!rnments of the Z.tember Stat.e.s and undermine the nccet~~sary 
spirit of solidarity among the people of Europe, 
- whereas matt£-rs relating to armaments, even when conside1·ed from the 
point of view of the common industrlal or commercial policy provided for 
in the Community Treaties, are by their v~ry nature closely linked to 
defence policy options, which do not concern the Assembly of the 
communities, 
L Feels that the couunissiun has no authority to establish contacts 
e~ther with NATO or with th(' responsible services of the Member States 
with a view to preparing Comm•Jr.il..y armaments procurement programmes; 
2. Instt·ucts its Prcs1dent to !:orw•1rd thJ.s resolutJ.on to the C"ommissicn 
and councJ.l and to th<.! G;;.vcrumf"!ntu of the Membt•r Stiltcs. 
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ANNEX IV 
MOTION FOH A ~ESOLUTION (Doe. 1-350/79) 
tabled by Mr JAQUET, Mr SARRE, Mr MAUROY, Mr ESTIER, Mr M. FAURE, Mrs CASTLE, 
Ms CLWYD, Mr LOMAS, Mr SEAL and Mr BOYES 
~ith request for an early vote pursuant to Rule 47<5> of the Rules of Procedure 
to wind up the debate on Oral Question Doe. 1-300/79 
on Community armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial 
policy 
The European Assembly, 
whereas the Treaties establishinq the European communities do not 9ive 
the community institutions any coapetence in matte~d of defence, 
- whereas several Community ~r States do not belonq to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Orqanization, 
1. Feels that it is neither desirable nor possible for the Commission 
to establish contacts with NATO: 
2. Notes, therefore, that in the intere•t•·oftBuropean coope~tioa it 
u not appropriate for tlile' Aa81Phly of ... U. luopean ec..unities to 
deliver an opinion on this matter. 
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ANNEX V 
MOTION FO~ A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-352/79) 
tabled by Mr MARCHAIS, Mr ANSART, Mr BAILLOT, Mr CHAMBEIRON, Mr DAMETTZ, 
Mrs DE MARCH, Mr DENIS, Mr FERNANDEZ, Mr FRISCHMANN, Mr GREMETZ, Mrs HOFFMANN, 
Mrs LE ROUX, Mr MAFFRE-BAUGE, Mr M. MARTIN, Mr PIQUET, Mrs POIRIER, Mr PRANCHERE, 
Mr VERGES and Mr WURTZ 
with request for an early vote pursuant to Rule 47(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
to wind up the debate on oral question Doe. 1-300/79 
on Community armaments procurement programmes within the framework of industrial 
policy 
the Assegply of the European Copmunitie!, 
- whereae matters of defence do not under any circumstances fall within 
the European Ca.aunity's te~ of reference, 
- whereas national defence must remain the exclueive responeibility of 
the national parliament of each "*-ber State ·of the EEC, 
1. Disclat.a the right, therefore, to place on ite agenda any matter 
relating to defence: 
2. Considers it unacceptable for the Commieeion to deal ln any way -
including the joint production of araa.ent~ - with queatione of 
~efence: 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the council and 
commission and to the Governments of the Member States. 
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ANNEX VI 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-357/79) 
tabled by Mr FERGUSSON, Sir Peter VANNECK, Mr R. JACKSON, Mr NORMANTON, Mr COTTRELL 
and Mr WELSH 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the ~ules of Procedure 
on Community armaments procument programmes with;n the framework of industrial 
policy 
fhe European Parli~ent, 
1. Asserts its c:ompc:-.·::lce to examine policies for defence procurement 
with1n the frameWQrk of the COmmunity' a industrial policy: 
2. calls on the commission to enqaqe in the necessary oonsultationc 
with the responsible defence and industrial services in the 
community and to report to the appropriate committees of Parliament; 
~- Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the President 
of the council, to the President of the Commission and to the 
Governments of Member States. 
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ANNEX VII 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-169/80/rev.) 
tabled by Mr GHERGO, Mr ADONNINO, Mr ALBER, Mr BARB!, Mr COSTANZO, Mr DALSASS, 
Mr DIANA, Mr FILIPPI, Mr I. FRIEDRICH, Mr GIAVAZZI, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HABSBURG, 
Mr HAHN, Mr LANGES, Mr LIGIOS, Mr MICHEL, Mr PEDINI, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mr SALZER, 
Mr SASSANO, Mr SCHALL, Mr WAWRZIK and Mr von WOGAU 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the protection of the civilian population against possible attacks by atomic, 
chemical or bacteriological weapons 
The European Parliament, 
- stressing that Europe desires peace and is working to preserve it, 
- noting, however, that the continuing arms race and the recent serious 
events which have taken place in various sensitive areas in the world 
are a matter of grave concern for people and governments and give rise 
to increasin~ fears of a possible conflict, with the danger of the use 
of atomic, chemical, bacteriological or other weapons, 
- pointing out that, according to the press, the super-powers have drawn 
up and in part already carried out vast programmes for the protection 
of the civilian population against the dangers of atomic, bateriological 
and chemical warfare, 
- pointing out that, in Europe, Switzerland has an efficient and wide-
spread network of fallout shelters including underground hospitals 
which can be put into use immediately, with 6~,000 beds and 830 
operating theatres, 
- noting that the problem of civil defence has not yet been tackled 
adequately in the Member States of the Community, 
- aware that the lack of coordinated overall measures on this subject, 
as well as creating differences between the various Member States, also 
detracts, because of the climate of insecurity which results from it, 
from the 'harmonious development of economic activities' and related 
'continuous 4nd balanced expansion' laid down in Article 2 of the EEC 
Treaty as primary aims of the Community, 
1. Asks the Commission to disclose the steps it has taken or intends to 
t~ke as a matter of urgency to promote closer cooperation between 
M~mbcr States as reg~rds protecting the civilian population against 
the risks of attack by atomic, chemical or bacteriological weapons: 
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2. Asks the Commission to draw up as a matter of urgency an effective 
Community uction programme on this subject accompanied by suitable 
financial nrad technical provisions: 
3. Instructs jts President to forward this resolution to the Commieaion. 
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ANNEX VIII 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-262/80) 
tabled by Mr LOMAS, ~r MEGAHY, Mr CABORN, Mr GALLAGHER, Mr KfY, Mr ENHIGHT, 
Mr ROGERS, Mr BALFE, Miss QUIN, Mrs BUCHAN, Mr ADAM, Mr BOYES, Mr SEAL, 
Ms CLWYD, Mr COLLINS and Mrs CASTLE 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on arms sales to Third World countries 
The European Parliament, 
- Notes that arms sales' froa EEC Member State• to 
Third WOrld countries are incre•sing, 
- Rocogniaea that ~his can lead to in~easing the danger 
to peace in the world, 
- BDtes that this increaaing expenditure by Third WOrld countries 
reduces the resources available·to feed, house and care for 
their people, 
- Bote a that Member Government• have 'Anl8 salellll\en' in order 
to persuade Third WOrld countries to buy .ore ar.a, 
1. Calls on Member States -
- To curtail arms production and to .witch resources to socially 
useful products 
- To atop all arme aalea to regime• Which clearly violate the baaic 
t. •1man rights of their people 
- ~ increaae the powera of their nationally elected Parlia .. nta in 
order to give far more public control over the sale of araa; 
2. Instructs the President to aend this a...olution to Mellber 
Gover.-nta. 
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MOTION FOH A HESOLIJTION (Doe. 1-~51+/81) 
tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBHOUCKE 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the supply of Belgian military equipment to Uruguay 
The European Parliament, 
- c!iaraayed by the delivery of a new consiqnaM~nt of Belgian weapons 
in particular 90Ma tub• and tank turrets, to Uruguay in June 1181, 
- whereas this delivery had been preced~d by repeated consivn-enta of 
ailitary supplies, includinq 13 tanks to Uruguay on 24 Karcb 1910 
and lllilitary equiPMent worth 7-,500,000 EU~ .• 
- whereas uru~uay is constantly perpetrating violations of bu.an 
riqhts, arbitrary i~riso~nts and political aurders, 
- considering that the supplv of Belgian armaments to Uruguay 
seriously compromises peaceful cooperation with the Third World 
and underaine• the cridibility of tbe Community's d ... nda that 
third countries respect human rights, 
1. Expresses its deep concern at the supply of military equip.ent 
to-dictatorships, in particular to Uruguay, 
2. Reguests the Council of Ministers to convey to the Belgian 
Government its indignation at the supply of Belgian ar .. to 
Uruguay and its condeanation of the growing Beltian arms 
... '' ,'· 
trade with Third World countries, in particular those countries 
where there are conflicts • 
ANNEX IX 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-1026/81) 
tabled by Ms CLWYD 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
concerning the use and production of chemical weapons 
•• ---The Buropean Parliept, 
alarmed at the recent statement by r.he u.~. assistant deputy 
Army Secretary, that the American Defence Science Board wishes 
to see the new nerve gas bomb deployed on US Air Fo~ce bases 
in Britain, 
- noting that after a 12 year halt in the production of new 
chemical weapons, the US has begun preparations for renewed 
production, 
- recognising that both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are prepared 
and equipped to fight in a chemical war environment in Europe, 
- concerned by reports that US Army scientists are believed to 
be designing a nerve gas warhead, which could be carried by ground 
launched Cruise Missiles, 
- believes that the us chemical weapons prograD~De only makes 
sense if at least one European country agrees to hoat the weapons, 
yet several - including w. Germany - have already clearly stated 
their opposition to this new development, 
- wishes to alert the people of Burope and to prc.ote a public 
debate on the use of offensive weapons of this kind, 
calls on the Council of Ministers to take active initiatives to 
promote current negotiations for a treaty prohibiting cha.ical 
weapons, that would complement the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
convention. To this end we urge the followtng actions: 
(a) Withdrawal of the reservation of the right to retaliate in 
kind made by some countries when ratifying the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol: 
(b) Resubnission of the draft Chemical Weapons Convention tabled 
by Britain in 1976, revised to incorporate new proposals on 
verification, consultation, scope and confidence-building 
aaeasures: 
(c) The opening of specific negotiations on the withdrawal of 
chemical weapons from both sides of Europe. 
ANNEX X 
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ANNEX Xl 
MOTION FO~ A RESOLUiiON (Doe. 1-356/82) 
tabled by Mr d'O~MtSSON, Mr BA~BI, Mr von HASSEL, Mr SCHALL, Mr HABSBURG, 
Mr C~OUX and Mr DESCHAMPS 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group) 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the need to provide better civil defence for the peoples of Europe 
'l'he European Parliament, 
A. aware that in the years to come, the deterioration 
of the balance of military power between East and 
West, the spread of terrorism anc inter.national 
violence and the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
increase the risk factors facing the civilian 
populations of Europe, 
B. convinced thi:lt there ea•·· be no effective defence 
and no plausible means of det~rrence unless there 
is pop11lar support fol· t:..&e defence effort and the 
commitment to detarr.e~ce, 
c. disturbed by t.he alraos::. total lack, in the countries 
of the European Commw-:.. t~', of an operational civil 
defence orgo.ni zai:.ion wru-:h 'v.'Ould be able to protect 
people. ensure the· cor.tinulty of national life and 
thereby preven;:. the outbl.·eak of panic, the blockage 
of lines of communicatiuH a!ld, above all, the loss 
of human lives ,,r, ,,, mase.Lvu :Jcale in the event of a 
conventional ur nucleac contl~ct, 
D. whereas the ;;v.rrcr: t vulnerability of Cl. vilian 
populations ~s iucompa:ible with a genu~ne strategy 
of deterrence which _t>resupposes not only the 
existence of aJidquate 1,1ilitary resources but also 
the will le use them in the event of an attack 
without t.his .£·ipos~:.e I:asulting in the extermination 
of the peupJ .e~ 'L 1: is designed to protect, 
E. stressing the fact that the lack of a nationwide 
civil defence syst~n would reduce population& to 
the status of hostages in any conflict, 
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F. whereas it is paradoxl.cal ::or Eu:.~_opectn gover1unents to 
spend considerable sums of money •)!l arms whilst failing 
to equip themselves with a civil defence s~r~te."U, 
G. whereas experts have estimated tnat 1 to 2% o~ European 
countries' overall. defence budget would create the 
possibility Of providin•J f<J.l. l<)Ut snelters for civilians, 
planning f.:vacuat·~o'1 pr.oc~dw:•:!.s, ~f,tting up a secure 
command network and establ 'lshJ.;:.l'.J emergency services 1 
H. whereas neutral r::ountries S'tch ..1s Switzerland or SWeden, 
and major powet·~ su..:·h as thr~ Soviet Union and China, 
have set up civil d.::£ence syst.er,1s which place their 
populations in a prJ:·,i tion c)f safety fal. grea.ter thari 
that of the EEC counLries, 
I. consider ln<.; c.l·~;.t·.: :;:-.~- ~.::ia~~.ly :Cl:tcause the Soviet'. union 
does not t·u it~ Ol~·c the por:;si.bili "LY of using nuclear 
chemical or bactet·io~ogical. v1eapons and accepts the 
risks-involved in.\.\.:!; territory 'by limitin~; its civilian 
losses, the urgen;."·/ ~1.nd th~ need for civil defence in 
our countries be(.!urr,r:).:; all the 1'1\ore pressi.ng, 
J. whereas the c.lest.ir.·~ :· s of 'i:.he free peoples of Europe 
would be just a:.:. (.~1·-:lsely linka<"t in solidarity in 
warti1ue as thsy have becom.;: in peace and whereas a 
conflict ·~hid; r. true\: on~ of · .... hem would nt'!cessarily 
affect. the othf.:j·~s, ''a'!"·cic'.lla:c]y in the event of mass 
evacuat.io.u, or :. ~1c terio:.' cc;.!.cal •~pidemics, 
K. whereas at c:tll even 1:~3 the introduction at community 
level of a civil defence network would be most useful, 
even in peacetime-, to pt·ovidc: relief for the victims 
of na tu.ral dL:;.:.ta tc:!: s ( <?.·31" t.l•q:.~<;tkes, floods, volcanic 
ruptions, ti..l:~l ''!.Jves, mal:ine pollution elc.). 
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.. 
1. States that it woulti oe dangerous and undt~mocr.:a\..1:: 
for ttv·.! conditions :.:01 the .?u-rvivaJ o~ t:he pE'\Jpl.:·~~ 
of Europ(': to be kevt from p•~l>lic: d<P.bat·.f. · 
--·- ---·.·--:--:- --
2. Calls on the Member States to ifitroduce civil defence 
progr~~es efficient enough to restor~ the credibility 
of t1iair defence systems, which are based on deter1.·cnce: 
3. CallE on the Member States to exchange. information and 
to ..:~qJ.n work en a coordinated plan ':o create e& 
cl ... 1 defence area at Community level: 
4. St.! -=·''~ ~·.ne c-dvisability of the atandarciiz~ti\Jr.. 0!" 
.:iv:.:. "lefenc£.: equipment at Community levt!l; 
5. ~nt .... :ucts its :!:'resident to forward this 1.·esolut.iorJ to the 
gov~:.,r;:unen ts of the Member States and t.o the Foreign 
Mi~~~ters meeting in political cooperation. 
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MOTION FOH A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-1017/82) 
tabled by Mr VANDEMEULEBROUCKE 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the arms trade 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX XII 
A - considering the special role of Europe as regards peace, as defined during 
the European Summit in The Hague in 1969 and the Conference of Heads of State 
and Government in Paris 1972, 
B- considering the Luxembourg Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 in which the 
European Institutions committed themselves to respecting the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms, 
c - noting however that arms trade is occupying an increasingly large place in 
the Member States• external trade, that supervision of the arms trade has 
repeatedly been put forward by the General Assembly of the UN In 1965, 1968, 
1970 and 1972 and recalling the innumerable opinions of representative bodies 
such as the World Council of Churches, the Synod of Bishops, the World Congress 
of major re·ligions, the Council of the French episcopacy, Amnesty International, 
Pax Christi and so many others, 
D - noting that measures have repeatedly been proposed in UNCTAD to counter the 
present-day arms trade, the influence of which is considered disastrous, 
E - noting that the arms trade also has economic disadvantages for the countries 
of the Third World which spend their scarce resources on the acquisition of 
weapons, 
F - noting that the various Member States are failing to reduce their arms 
deliveries and that, moreover, there are great differences from one Member 
State to another in Legislation on trade in, and the export of, military 
weapons, 
G- noting the numerous resolutions of the European Parliament against violations 
of human rights which however fail to condemn the complicity of Member States 
which supply arms to repressive regimes, 
1. Requests the Commission and the Council immediately to draw up a directive 
subjecting trade in war weapons and materials with non-Member States to strict 
rules with a checkable export licence system under which an immediate embargo 
can be imposed for any instance of export and sale to countries whose regimes 
fail to respect human rights; 
2. Asks Council to give extensive consideration at its next meeting to the pro-
blem of trade in weapons and war materials and to examine all the measures 
which could be taken to ensure that the legal, political and moral values 
underlying the European Community shape the basic principles of the necessary 
common guideline for trade in weapons, munition and war materials with non-
Member States; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the 
Council. 
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MOTION FOR A ~ESOLUTION (Doe. 1-1050/82) 
tabled by Sir Peter VANNECK and Mr FERGUSSON 
pursuant to Hule 47 of the Hules of Procedure 
ANNEX XIII 
on cooperation between the Assembly of the Western European Union and the 
European Parliament 
The European Parliament, 
A - considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts 
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it, 
B - convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can 
make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful 
relations, 
C- recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements 
which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establish-
ment of common bases for economic development, 
D - anxious to help, by expanding the technological base of the Community's 
manufacturing industries, and to raise the standard of living and 
further the works of peace, 
E- recalling the resolution of the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging 
of their essential interests, to create the basis for a broader and 
deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts and to 
lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a 
destiny henceforward shared, 
F - mindful of the commitment of Member States to the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
G -mindful of the responsibility of the Assembly of the Western European 
Union for defence matters under the modified Brussels Treaty, 
H- mindful of the Treaties establishing the European Community, 
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I - mindful of the proposal of the European Commission for a programme of 
research and development in the aeronautical sector, Doe. 319/75, 
J - mindful of the proposal by the Commission for a research and develop-
ment programme in the field of informatics, Doe. COMC79) 650 final, 
Doe. COM (80) 421 final, 
K - mindful of its report on cooperation in European armaments procurement, 
Doe. 83/78, 
L - mindful of its report on equipment manufactured in the Community which 
can be used for th~ inspection of fishing activities in Community 
waters and the surveillance of other activities affecting the common 
system for the conservation and management of fishing reserves, Doe. 442/78, 
M- mindful of its report on the surveillance and protection of shipping 
routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials for the countries 
of the European Community, Doe. 1-697/80, 
N- mindful of the decision of the European Council in Copenhagen, December 
1973, to develop more actively a common policy on industrial, scientific 
and technological cooperation, 
0 - in the expectation that Spain will contribute to European Union through 
adhesion to th~ tr~aties establishing the ~uropean Community and to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
1. Welcomes the recommendation of the Assembly of the Western European 
Union, 2 December 1981, to pave the way for establishing a European 
Union based on harmonization of the Rome and Brussels Treaties; 
2. Accepts the call by the Assembly of the Western European Union, 
2 December 1981, for cooperation with the European Parliament without 
prejudice to any decisions which member countries might subsequently 
take; 
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3. Believes that cooperation between the Assembly of the Western European 
union and the turopean Parliament can be mut11ally strengthening in the 
pursuit of peilce, d~tente, cultural and economic cooperation in Europe 
and in determining the development of European Union; 
4. Invites the President of the European Parliament to contact the 
President of the Assembly of the Western European Union to ensure: 
a) that invitations are sent regularly to observers from the Assembly 
of the Western European Union to attend plenary sessions of the 
European Parliament when the agenda includes debates on matters 
affecting Europe's security and vice versa; 
b) that invitations are sent regularly to observers from the Assembly of 
the Western European Union to attend meetings of the Political 
Affairs Committee when the agenda includes matters affecting Europe's 
security; 
c) that a standing committee drawn from the Assembly of the Western 
European Union and the European Parliament should be set up by the 
most appropriate means to ensure harmonization of their work, 
including regular meetings of the secretariats of both institutions, 
at least twice yearly; 
5. Invites its President to make the necessary contacts with the President 
of the Assembly of the Western European Union with a view to harmonization 
of views on economic and political matters which affect Europe's security. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS 
Draftsman: Mr Nordmann 
On 8 October 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
was authorized to draw up an opinion on the report on arms procurement 
within the common industrial policy being prepared by the Political 
. 
~ffairs Committee. 
On 24 November 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr NORDMANN as draftsman of its opinion. 
The Committee considered the draft opinion at its meeting on 18 - 19 
~anuary 1983 and adopted it on that date by a vote of 13 in favour 
to 3 against with 2 abstentions. 
PARTICIPATED IN THE VOTE: 
,r. HOPPER (first Vice-chairman and acting chairman>; Mr MACARIO 
<vice-chairman>; Mr DELEAU <vice-chairman>; Mr. NORDMANN Cdraftsman>; 
lr. BEAZLEY; Mr BONACCINl; Mr CABORN; 'Mrs DESOUCHES; Mr FORTH 
(deputizing for Mr Welsh>; Mr FRIEDRICH; Mr HERMAN; Mr PAPANTONIOU; 
Hr ROGALLA (deputizing for Mr Mihr>; Mr SCHNITKER; Mr Van ROMPUY; 
Mr. VERGEER; Sir Frederick WARNER <deputizing for Miss Forster>; 
and Mr WEDEKIND (deputizing for Mr von Wogau>. 
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Introduction 
1. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has been asked to comment 
on the economic aspects of the draft text prepared by Mr FERGUSSON 
(PE 78.344/rev.ll) on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee. This text 
covers a wide range of topics, but it is the understanding of your draftsman 
that the Political Affairs Committee will be dividing it in two parts, and be 
considering these two parts within separate time limits. Your draftsman will 
limit his comments, therefore, to that part of the report dealing with arms 
procurement within the common industrial policy, (and, to a much lesser extent 
to that part dealing with arms sales), which is to be considered first by the 
Political Affairs Committee. Your draftsman points out, however, that certain 
topics to be covered at a Later date, such as civil defence policy, have impor-
tant economic implicat.ions, and that a further opinion from the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs may well be necessary on that occasion. 
Economic importance of the defence equipment industry for the Community 
2. The economic importance of the defence equipment market within the Com-
munity hardly needs underlining. This was discussed in some detail in the 
previous opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs1, and also 
in the study prepared for the European Commission on ''European Technological 
Cooperation and Defence Procurement; Statistical and Institutional Analysis 
of Defence Procurement and Production in the European Community"2• The 
Latter study's conclusions are summarised in a further report to the Commission 
by Mr David Greenwood of the Aberdeen Centre for Defence Studies on "A policy 
for promoting defence and technological cooperation among west European 
countries"3• This pointed out that expenditures by the Nine on major items 
of defence equipment amounted to some 11 billion EUAs in 1978, and that if one 
1
oraftsman Mr NORMANTON contained in Doc.8378/78 on European armaments 
procurement cooperation, KLEPSCH report. 
2
sy Mr D. Greenwood with Mr. R. Angus, the so-called Aberdeen study, June 1979 
3III 1499/80 
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uses a wider interpretation of what constitutes procurement spending aggregate 
EEC demand in 1978 was around 18 to 19 billion EUAs. On the supply side, 
aggregate defence-related sales in 1978 amounted to 22 billion EUAs. 
3. Yet while this aggregate data illustrates the importance of the defence 
equipment market for the Community economy it hides a number of other signifi-
cant issues. One such issue is the high Level of dependence of the Community 
on the United States with regard to large missile systems and equipment, and 
consequently with great imbalance in the Community's arms trade with the United 
States. The Aberdeen study cited above estimated sales of !1)83 million from 
the United Sates to Europe compared with US purthases from Europe of only 
S 12 5 m iL Lion. 
4. The various studies have all pointed then to the potential advantages for 
the Community, not just in military but in general economic terms, of greatly 
enhanced cooperation in this field: 
- being able to take full advantage of the Community market in order 
to reduce overlap and waste and to achieve the necessary division 
of Labour and economies of scale in both research and development 
and in the actual production process. The consequent achievement 
of much greater efficiency than if the various member countries of 
the Community continued to go their own way, and only collaborated 
on an ad hoc basi~ with the Community thus being able ~ get more 
for the same funds, or the same amount for less funds; 
- a reduction of that dependence on the United States for advanced 
military equipment which is costly for the Community in both 
financial and technological terms. The consequent achievement of 
a real "two-way street" with the Americans, and of a division of 
Labour between the Americans and the Europeans based much more on 
real underlying comparative advantage than on the current situation 
of unnecessary fragmentation of the Community defence industry; 
- increased spill overs from defence applications to other sectors of 
the economy in, for instance, such fields as micro-electronics and 
telecommunications, aerospace, raw materials usage, and so on: the 
consequent improvement in Community competitiveness in advanced 
technological sectors of crucial importance for the future. 
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What $hould be done? The two strategies 
S. Neverthele·.~, wh1le these advantages of enhanced cooperation are generally 
accepted there is clearly no consensus on the best strategy for the Community 
to follow. As the explanatory statement to the FERGUSSON report points out 
there is a division between advocates of an ambitious approac~ exemplified by 
the report of Mr KLEPSCH, which called on the Commission to submit to the Council 
a European action programme for the development and production of conventional 
armaments within the framework of a common industrial policy, and advocates of a 
more cautious approach, exemplified by the report of Mr Greenwood which would 
reject "grand institutional" designs, and emphasise instead "separate but con-
certed policy initiatives" and "modest institutional innovation". 
6. Mr FERGUSSON himself speaks in his text of the need to find a balance between 
these two different approaches while indicating that his sympathies lie much 
closer to the far-reaching proposals put forward in the KLEPSCH report. On the 
other hand, Mr DAVIGNON, in his foreword to the GREENWOOD report on behalf of 
the Commission, shows himself to be an advocate of the more limited approach, that 
would concentrate on improving the flow of needed information within the Community, 
possibly through the creation of a "Defence Procurement Analysis Unit", and on 
further toordination of public purchasing at Community level. 
7. Your draftsman does not believe that it should be the role of the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs to get involved in a detailed discussion of the 
merits of either of these two approaches. 
8. Nevertheless, one general comment can be made. Those who advocate a more 
sweeping approach have argued that a Community programme for the development and 
production of armaments would'have multiplier effects throughout a whole range 
of important industrial sectors, and be a powerful stimulus to the development 
of Community industrial policy in general. 
If the pol itica.l wilL were there to-establish such a prog~cmne ·this woula Lrdcx.btedly be true. 
Unfortunately, when one assesses the likelihood of such a political will developing, 
a reverse argument can be used. ·If the ~ommunity is having such great difficulties in 
developing ird.lstrial strategies for sectors in severe crisis or for advanced technology 
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sectors, in both of which categories enhanced Community cooperation is clearly 
essential, it is hard to see how there can be consensus on the even more con-
troversial area of defence procurement. In this field the key decisions 
are taken to an even greater degree by national governments, cooperation tends 
to take the form of bilateral agreements rather than through Community mechanisms, 
and any increased Community involvement would be looked at with great suspicion 
not only by individual governments, but by a considerable segment of public 
opinion. 
9. Your draftsman does believe, however, that it should be the role of the 
committee to point out those measures which mv~t. be taken and effectively imple-
mented, if there is to be any form of progress at all, and so that, if, and 
when,the necessary political decisions are taken to have much closer coordination 
of the arms procurement needs of Member States at Community level, a better 
industrial environment for such initiatives would already exist. 
10. Inevitably this means putting the emphasis on the Community's continuing 
failure, as outlined above, to develop.any form of cbherent industria~ 
strategy either in general terms or in terms of specific sectors. 
much remains to be done, in others little has been achieved at all. 
In some areas 
The need to make progress on this front has been emphasised on numerous 
occasions by the European Parliament, and by the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs in particular. The steps that must be taken include: 
- reinforcement of the internal market, through the promotion of 
standardisation, through the removal of existing barriers to trade 
and the prevention of new barriers; 
- effective implementation of the adopted directives on public work 
and supplies, and further liberalisation of public procurement: 
Here it should be pointed out that there is a current blockage at 
Council level in the field of telecommunications, and that the 
Commission itself admits1 that its work on public procurement in 
the context of.itsmultiannual programme on data processing has not 
even begun, years after the approval of the programme; 
1In its latest report on this Parliament Doe. r553/82 
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- coordinated Community efforts to help promote key technologies of 
the future, such as the new information technologies, which also have 
important defence implications. Again it must be pointed out that 
little has been achieved,that the multiannual data processing programme 
referred to above has only progressed slightly and on a much more 
limited scale than originally envisage4 and that the much heralded 
ESPRIT project is still in its infancy; 
- progress in developing a proper European company law; 
- Commission examination of other barriers to innovation and what could 
be done to remove them 
11. These are just a few of the most obvious steps that must be taken that 
would help to enhance the Community's defence capabilities even in the absence 
of an explicit Community armaments policy, and that would greatly facilitate 
its implementation if such a policy were to be agreed upon. 
Arms sales to third countries 
12. Your draftsman does not consider it appropriate for the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs to enter into a detailed discussion on the con-
troversial subject of arms sales to third countries. He would, however, like 
to make one point, stemming from the argument in paragraph 80 of the explanatory 
stetement of the FERGUSSON report, where it is stated that "specialisation in 
European arms manufacture would engender the large production runs and economies 
of scale that could, coupled with the development of a structured transatlantic 
armaments market, reduce or eliminate dependence on arms exports outside the 
Atlantic Alliance". While your draftsman would agree that the current inability 
of individual Community countries to be able to take full advantage of the scale 
of the Community market does give them an additional incentive to export arms to 
third countries, he is sceptical of whether the creation of a more integrated 
European market would reduce such arms sales to third countries in practice. 
Indeed, any increased efficiency that would accrue might create a spur to step 
up rather than to reduce overall exports. 
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Conclusions 
13. In the light of the comments made above the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs makes the following observations on the relevant sections 
of the draft motion for a resolution from the Political Affairs Committee. 
14. The committee agrees with the draft motion's emphasis on strengthening 
the internal market, through promoting standardisation and removing barriers 
to trade. It believes that a high emphasis should also be put on further 
coordination of public procurement policies, and insists, in particular, 
on real progress in this respect in the two key fields of telecommunications 
and data processing. ~ 
'I 
15. The committee considers that the draft report puts insufficient emphasis 
on the failure of the Community to establish and to implement coherent indus-
trial policy objectives, and in particular those high technology sectors such 
as the new information technologies, which are of such direct relevance to 
defence procurement. 
16. In this context the committee expresses considerable doubts about the 
suggestion in the draft motion that the Commission should develop a programme, 
in cooperation with Japan, on computer-aided design and m~nufacturing sys~em~ and 
artificial intelligence. The committee believes, rather, that the Community 
needs to build up its independent capability in these spheres which will be 
of considerable importance for the maintenance of its competitiveness in the 
future. The already adopted Community micro-electronics support programme, 
and the proposed ESPRIT programme already include activities in the sphere 
suggested in the draft motion from the Political Affairs Committee, including 
the promotion of increased cooperation between Community firms. The central 
need t~erefore, is to properly implement and build upon these programmes. 
17. The committee believes that if these measures were taken the European 
arms procurement industry would be placed in a much stronger position. If 
the necessary political decisions were then taken to enable bolder steps 
towards true Community-wide coordination of arms procurement and production 
a number of important obstacles would already have been removed or reduced. 
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(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure> 
of the Committee on External Relations 
Draftsman: Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul 
On 19 January 1983 the Committee on External Economic Relations appointed 
Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul draftsman of the opinion. 
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 23 and 
24 February, 23 and 24 March and 19 April 1983. On 19 April 1983 it approved 
the proposals in Chapter I by 12 votes to 7 with 3 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Sir Fred Catherwood, chairman; 
Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, vice chairman and draftsman; Mrs Baduel-Glorioso, 
Mr Bonaccini (deputizing for Mr Galluzzi>, Mr Gauthier (deputizing for 
Mr Anglade>, Lord Harmar-Nicholls (deputizing for Miss Hooper>, Mr Jonker, 
Mr Lenz (deputizing for Mr Lemmer), Mr Mommersteeg, Mrs L. Moreau, 
Mr Pelikan, Mrs Phlix (deputizing for Mr Majonica), Mr Pesmazoglou, Mrs Pruvot, 
Mr Radoux, Mr Rieger, Prince Sayn-Wittgenstein, Mr Spencer, Sir Jack Stewart-
Clark, Mr Vankerkhoven (deputizing for Mr Stella>, Mr Welsh (deputizing for 
Sir Fred Warner) and Mr Ziagas. 
WP0355E 
OR.DE. . 
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I. Community and international measures proposed by the Committee on External 
Economic Relations 
<1> The need for international action to limit conventional arms transfers 
-----------------------------------
1. The report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security 
issues ('Common Security') (1) rightly points out that the scale of arms 
transfers has more than doubled in the last ten years, that supplies in 1981 
repesented an overall value of almost 30,000 million dollars, that orders 
were placed for an even greater amount and that more than three quarters of 
arms supplies were to developing countries. 
Action by the Member States of the European Community alone would therefore be 
an important step towards limiting arms transfers but at the same time it 
would need to be augmented by an international system of guidelines for and 
restrictions on arms exports which was binding above all on the two major arms 
exporters, the USA and the USSR. 
2. The Foreign Ministers of the Community meeting in political cooperation 
should therefore take steps internationally in the following areas: <2> 
(1) The supplier states should embark on negotiations designed to bring about 
a general limitation on arms supplies to the Third World. The aim should 
be to reduce continually the level of arms exports. 
(2) The United States and Soviet Union should resume without preconditions 
their talks on the transfer of conventional weapons (CAT-Round, 
Conventional Arms Transfer Talks which took place from 1977 to 1980 and 
then were broken off). Other major suppliers, e.g. the relevant Member 
States, should take part in these talks.' 
(3) At the same time talks should begin between the supplier and recipient 
states in regions where the situation is particularly precarious. 
(4) The recipient states should be encouraged to develop their own guidelines 
to prevent arms supplies and avoid new regional arms races. 
<1> Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmanent and Security Issues 
('Common Security') p. 175 
(2) See Andrew J. Pierre, op. cit. p.p. 291 et seq 
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3. The Committee on External and Economic Affairs emphasises the need pointed 
out by the rapporteur Mr Ferguson in Section II of his report to draw up joint 
rules for arms exports and restrictions on the export of specific types of 
weapons to certain Third Countries. In particular it shares its view that the 
arms sales policy pursued by certain Member States without consideration of 
common interests or the interests and policies of other countries may lead to 
instability or war in other parts of the world. The following proposal for a 
European Convention against arms exports might serve to lend concrete 
expression to this view. At the same time it is a proposal which should be 
developed in the context of European Political Cooperation <EPC). For it is 
scarcely conceivable that the Community could be given responsibility for 
matters relating to arms exports, which are closely linked with the foreign 
policies of individual countries, until a common foreign policy has been 
formulated. 
There is not necessarily any connection between restrictions on arms exports 
to Third Countries and the call for specialization of European armaments 
production made by Mr Ferguson in the main part of his report. Possibly as 
the draftsman of the opinion for the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, Mr Nordmann, remarks there is a contradiction between the two: 'Any 
increased efficiency that would accrue might create a spur to step up rather 
than reduce overall exports' (1). In its opinion, however, the Committee on 
External and Economic Relations has only considered the question of arms 
exports that fall within its terms of reference and not considered the other 
question of arms procurement within a common industrial policy which is dealt 
with in the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
4. In the view of the Committee on External Economic Relations the Community 
Foreign Ministers should agree as part of EPC on the following common 
guidelines to restrict arms exports: 
Arms exports are permissible between Members States of the European 
Community within the boundaries of the law. 
<1> PE 81.975/fin., (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs) 
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Other states may be accorded the same status. These shall be shown on 
a standard list. Decisions on this are to be taken by the national 
governments following consultation in EPC and consultation with the 
European Parliament. Arms exports to such states are permissible 
within the boundaries of the law provided they appear on the special 
list of countries. 
Exports of weapons to other ~ountries should be restricted. Exceptions 
should only be possible following consultation in EPC, following 
consultation of the European Parliament, provided that the governments 
can demonstrate a compelling need in terms of important European 
foreign and security policy interests and that there is no obstacle in 
the internal situation of the country concerned. 
5. In the view of the Committee on External Economic Relations the Foreign 
Ministers should take steps to create a European arms-exports control agency 
which would supply information on arms exports. This could at the same time 
lead to greater approximation of the national policies of the Member States in 
this sector. 
It could also consider all the consequences for the labour market of 
converting armaments capacity into non-military production and research 
capacity. 
6. In the event of the USA and the USSR resuming negotiations on the sale of 
conventional weapons and achieving an agreement on restricting their sales of 
such weapons, in particular to the developing countries, the Member States 
should undertake to accede to that agreement. The Council of Foreign 
Ministers meeting in political cooperation should, as of now, initiate moves 
for a resumption of negotiations on a general restriction on arms supplies to 
developing countries. 
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11. Justification for the proposal for a Community convention on arms exports 
7. For the purposes of this proposal, weapons of war are defined according to 
the list of arms applied in the weapons control law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, i.e. 'weapons of war include atomic weapons, chemical weapons, 
weapons with a calibre over 90 millimeters (such as cannons, howitzers etc), 
missiles, mines, bombs, armoured vehicles, warships, military aircraft, 
weapons with a calibre up to 90 millimeters, anti-tank weapons, military 
helicopters and the main components of weapons, explosives, etc. Weapons of 
war are objects, materials and organisms capable in isolation or in 
combination with each other or with other objects, materials and organisms of 
destroying or causing damage to persons or materials and serving as a means of 
employing violence in armed confrontation between states'. (Weapons control 
law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 Apr~l 1961). 
The EPC arrangements would not apply to a large number of other armaments 
(including hand held firearms and ammunition) although comparable arrangements 
in this area would certainly be desirable. Restrictions on weapons of war, 
however, would be a first step. It would also be desirable to have EPC 
regulations analogous to those for weapons applying to the issue of licences 
to export armaments manufacturing equipment. States placed on an equal status 
with Community Member States and which are then allowed to receive exports of 
weapons should be required to give a binding commitment on the final 
destination. (No further transfer). 
The proposal for consultation in EPC and of the European Parliament is to 
prevent current national practice being continued by using the loophole of 
exceptions to a general ban on arms exports and to ensure that aspects of a 
European foreign policy gradually emerge. 
In practice, consultation of the European Parliament could be carried out by 
means of a small committee which would include the chairmen of the groups and 
one additional representative from each. 
The principle that exceptional approval for arms exports should not be given 
where objections can be made to the internal situation of the country 
concerned is to ensure that such decisions are ruled out if there is a danger 
that weapons will be used by the recipient country to violate human rights. 
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8. Derogations from the principle of preventing arms exports should be 
allowed only if all the four criteria mentioned (European interests, external 
policy interests and security interests, and the internal situation of the 
country concerned) are satisfied. 
At all events, it will be necessary to ensure that arms exports allowed by way 
of exception do not harm another Member State militarily or threaten its 
security and territorial integrity. 
III. Justification for a common approach by the Member States 
9. A common approach to the export of weapons and armaments to third 
countries by all Member States is necessary and would be useful for the 
following reasons: 
I As the commercial scale of arms exports by Community countries has clearly 
grown, solely national provisions are producing distortions and imbalances of 
competition which also affect other sectors anp areas of the economy. 
The example of 'barter trading' (weapons for oil) shows that unilaterally 
favourable national terms can be gained for the supply of important raw 
materials. 
Such barter transactions may well violate the provisions of Article 223 of the 
EEC Treaty which is intended to rule out distortions of competition on the 
common market. 
At the same time a binding agreement between the Member States would 
provide the best protection against restrictive arrangements on arms 
exports of one Member country <e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany) being 
circumvented. 
A common approach would also reduce the possibility of one Member State 
concluding arms export deals on behalf of another which refuses to indulge 
in such transactions for one reason or another. 
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In the case of military conflict in areas of the Third World the 
uncoordinated and extensive supply of arms from various Member States with 
different foreign policy objectives represents a threat to the solidarity 
of the Community itself. A ban on supplies for weapons which is only 
imposed once a conflict has already broken out makes little sense it 
supplies are continued to other regions thus preparing the next conflict. 
And finally: a regional approach - notwithstanding the need for worldwide 
restriction on arms transfers - has far greater chance of succeeding than 
the global approach. Because the interest of the states involved can far 
more easily be coordinated than the global interests of the two super-
powers. 
IV. Justification for a general assessment of arms exports 
10. Section 1(b) of Article 223 of the EEC Treaty allows any Member State to 
take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interest of its security which are connected with the production of 
or trade in arms, munitions and war material. 
This section goes on to say that such measures shall not adversely affect the 
conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are 
not intended for specifically military purposes. Under Article 223<2>, during 
the first year of entry into force of the Treaty, the Council, acting 
unanimously, was to draw up a list of products to which Community provisions 
did not apply. This implies that trade in the war material included in this 
List would not be subject to the provisions of the Treaty while material not 
on this List and material not specifically intended for military purposes 
would fall under the provisions of the Treaty including provisions relating to 
competition. 
11. On 15 April 1958, the Council drew up the List of goods <weapons, 
munitions, war material) to which the provisions of Article 223{1)(b) of the 
EEC Treaty applied. As this Council decision was based on Article 189 of the 
EEC Treaty, the list was not published. As far as the Community's powers in 
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this sphere are concerned we may quote Article 225 of the EEC Treaty: 'If 
measures taken ••••• have the effect of distorting the conditions of competition 
in the common market, the Commission shall, together with the State concerned, 
examine how these meas~res can be adjusted to the rules laid down in this 
Treaty.' 
Moreover, the Commission <or a Member State) can bring the matter directly 
before the Court of Justice if it considers that a Member State is making 
improper use of the powers provided under the Treaty. So far neither the 
Council nor the Commission has adopted either regulations or directives. 
(2) International agreements 
------------
12. This type of exception to supranational or international provisions is 
also found in international trade agreements. For example Article XXI of GATT 
allows the parties to the agreement to withold information which they believe 
would run counter to their essential security interest and to take such 
measures as they believe necessary to protect their essential security 
interests in relation to fissile materials or raw materials from which these 
can be produced. The same applies to trade in weapons, munitions and raw 
materials and all trade directly or indirectly serving to supply the armed 
forces with other goods or materials. This also includes measures taken on 
the basis of the commitment by countries under the charter of the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and international security. 
13. One exception is the procedure by the NATO states and Japan in the field 
of East-West trade where what is known as a CoCom List has been drawn up 
CCoCom =Coordination Committee for East-West Trade Policy) which has Led to a 
joint agreement on Limiting the export of strategically important equipment 
and technology such as electronic products, computers, semi-conductors, glass 
fibres, optical products and advanced metallurgical goods from the NATO states 
and Japan to the member states of the Warsaw Pact. 
(3) Armaments cooperation between industrialized countries 
---------------------------
14. Although the various national governments are responsible for parlia-
mentary control of the export of defence and other strategically important 
material, there is growing bilateral, and more recently trilateral, 
WP0355E 
OR. DE. 
- 66 - PE 78.344/fin. 
cooperation between the various Member States of the Community and with the 
USA in the field of armaments research, development and production. 
At the present time the strongest links in arms cooperation are between France 
and the Federal Republic of Germany and France and the United Kingdom. 
Notwithstanding this bilateral cooperation, there are no joint agreements on 
supplying jointly-developed products to third countries. The only exception is 
the (quasi) final destination clause which requires consent for exports to 
third countries in the case of the Anglo-German-Italian joint project, MRCA 
(Tornado). 
15. Despite the increasing level of arms cooperation, most internal NATO or 
Community transactions are imports of weapons from the USA. Italy with an 
arms import quota of 12.1% of all arms imports by industrialized countries is 
the leading importer of US arms followed by Greece with 10.6%, the Netherlands 
with 5.9%, Belgium with 5.6%, the Federal Republic of Germany 4.2%, United 
Kingdom 3.2% and finally Denmark with 2.2% <1>. 
(4) Member States as arms exporters 
16. Although imports by Member States of weapons and armaments from the USA 
are clearly the main category of arms dealing within the alliance, the four 
major Community countries - France, Italy, the United Kingdom and West Germany 
- are nevertheless net exporters in the armaments sector. The other Member 
States are by comparison relatively little involved in arms exports, for 
example Belgium with arms exports of $ 70 m compared to arms imports of 
$ 290 m, Greece with $ 5 m and $ 380 m or Denmark with 0 and $ 30 m (2). 
17. France, Italy, the United Kingdom and West Germany in this order are among 
the leading exporters of major weapon systems. France with 10.8% and third 
place in the world (following the USA and the USSR), Italy with 4% and fourth 
place, the United Kingdom 3.7% in fifth place and West Germany with 3% in 
sixth place (3). France's main exports of major weapon systems consist of 
(1> See SIPRI Armaments Yearbook 1981/82, p. 196 
(2) ACDA (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) World Special on Military 
Expenditures, 1979 
(3) SIPRI Armaments Yearbook 1981/1982, p. 184 
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aircraft and missiles which account for 57% and 20% respectively of all arms 
export!>, Italy with aircraft and missiles of ~6% and 34%, the United 'Kingdom 
with aircraft and ships for 33% and 14% and West Germany with tanks and ships 
for 45% and 38 (1). 
18. The regional distribution of major weapon systems imports by third world 
countries is as follows: 
Middle East: 48% 
Far East: 17% 
North Africa: 9.2% 
Southern Africa: 9% 
South America: 9% 
Southern Asia. 6.4% 
Central America: 1.4% and 
Australasia: 0.01% <2> 
19. Arms exports to developing countries represent a major proportion of the 
overall arms exports of the four largest Member States, namely for 
France 76.5% 
Italy 76.5% 
United Kingdom 81.7% and 
West Germany 37.6% (3) 
(5) Trends in arms exports 
20. Within recent decades, arms exports to developing countries have more than 
doubled whereas imports to the industrialized nations have barely risen. At 
the same time the level of military aid granted to third world countries has 
steadily fallen; this applies in particular to the USA, France and the United 
Kingdom (4). Moreover both the USA and the USSR now grant less economic aid 
than the level of their arms sales (5). The qualitative changes in world arms 
exports have been just as dramatic over this period as quantitative changes. 
(1) SIPRI Armaments Yearbook 1981/1982, p. 185 
<2> SIPRI Armaments Yearbook 1981/1982, p. 135 
(3) SIPRI Armaments Yearbook 1981/1982, p. 184 
(4) See The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Andrew J. Pierre, 1982 p.p. 9 and 10 
(5~ See The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Andrew J. Pierre, 1982, p. 5 
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Whereas until 1970 the beneficiary countries received almost exclusively 
obsolete equipment dating back to the Second World War or the period 
immediately after, they are now receiving"quite sophi~ticated weaponry from 
the supplier countries. For example in 1960 only tour developing countries 
possessed supersonic aircraft whereas by 1977 there were 47. There is a 
further qualitative transformation from the steady growth of transfers based 
on joint.production and Licensing. This system for acquiring expertise and 
procuring Western systems now extends to more than twb dozen states in the 
third world (1) which results in the rapid proliferation of particularly 
highly sophisticated weapon systems. 
21. It is striking that foreign orders often enjoy higher priority than 
domestic orders and play a central role in the decision to develop products 
which are then also used to equip the armies of the various supplier countries. 
A further change has taken place as regards the flow of armaments. Until the 
middle of the 60's the exported weapons went to developed countries which were 
partners of the USA and NATO or in an alliance with the Soviet Union but in 
the Late 70's the flow of armaments shifted towards the developing countries. 
Three-quarters of international arms exports now go to the Third World - the 
Persian Gulf, the Middle East and Africa and Latin America - and there is no 
region of the world which has not experienced a growth in arms imports(2). 
One reason for this is that the purchase of new weapon systems in one region 
compels neighbouring states to acquire comparable weapon systems (3}. 
(1) See The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Andrew J. Pierre, 1982, p. 11 
<2> A. Pierre op. cit., p.p. 12 and 13 
(3) Report by Independent Commission for Disarmament and Security ('Common 
Security', also known as the 'Palme Report'), p. 108: 
'the value of arms imports by developing countries in the years 1975 to 
1979 amounted to US $ 65,200 m at 1978 prices of which US $32,300 m were 
in OPEC countries and US $32,900 m in other developing countries. In 1970 
the developing countries imported at the dollar exchange rate of 1978 
weapons worth US $5,600 m and in 1979 the equivalent of US$ 16,100 m.' 
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22. Arms exports clearly represent one aspect of the recycling of oil revenue 
<see Palme and also the 'Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues'). This explains the trend for growing arms exports both to 
oil-producing developing countries and oil importing developing countries. 
The following figures show that the increase in arms exports is by no means 
restricted to the former category: 
Between 1977 and 1979 six oil-importing developing countries, including two 
with a per capita income of less than US $ 200 per year, imported weapons to a 
value of over $ 1,000 m (1). Pierre concludes that as far as the supplier 
countries are concerned, particularly in the Community, and contrary to 
official political pronouncements, it is a question of commercial interests 
whereas in the case of the superpowers the main priority is political 
competition in the Third World. 
(6) Economic aspects of arms exports 
23. The general conclusion of the study by Pierre <2> is that no supplier 
country is heavily dependent on arms exports either in terms of foreign trade, 
where arms exports only represent between 3% and 5% of the total exports of 
industrialized countries, or to the extent that the balance of payments is 
kept in balance or employment safeguarded by arms exports. 
If it is true that the increase in arms exports in the middle of the 70's was 
related to the increased price of oil, then there is no evidence that arms 
exports were a major source of earnings to compensate for the deficit on the 
balance of payments. On the contrary the adjustment of the balance of 
payments to increased oil prices took place particularly quickly in Japan, a 
country which exports relatively few arms exports (3). Pierre rightly points 
out the following. 'Arms exporters also run the risk that oil prices will be 
increased to pay for expensive weapons' (4). 
<1>'Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues', p. 109 
<2> See Pierre, 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales', Section II, particularly 
pages 68, 78-87, 100-101, 109-116 
c(3) See Pierre 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales' p. 24 
(4) See Pierre 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales' p. 26 
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24. From the macro-economic point of view the claim that the arms industry 
creatE's and safequards jobs is unfounde-d. If ,Jrm,JmPnl~; pl.1y .1 major role in 
the overall economy this tends to exert a restrictive effect on non-military 
branches of industry because the necessary resources, for example for 
modernizing productive equipment, are la~king and research and development in 
non-military spheres of industry is neglected. A number of studies therefore 
conclude that there is a significant correlation between a high proportion of 
GNP for military expenditure and high rates of unemployment. 
Thes~ studies also highlight the relationship between a high percentage of GNP 
as military expenditure and low productivity growth rates and vice versa (1). 
Nor is it true to claim that a large number of jobs depend on arms exports if 
one considers the precise figures for the proportion of overall manufacturing 
accounted for by the armaments industry in: 
France: 2.72" 
United Kingdom: 2.26% 
Italy: 1.33" 
Federal Republic of Germany: 0.43" 
which represents 1.7% of all French exports and 1.5" of all U.K. exports <2>. 
The number of those employed in the armaments industry is 436,000 in France, 
630,000 in the United Kingdom, 161,000 in Italy and 238 000 in West Germany 
(3). 
The number of those employed directly for arms exports is as follows: 151,000 
in France, 168,000 in the United Kingdom, 76,000 in Italy and 39,000 in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (4). The armaments industry is however 
concentrated in certain sectors and regions. And Pierre is certainli right 
when he observes : 'The data on direct employment only tells part of the 
(1) ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) op cit: SIPRI Armaments 
Yearbook 1981/1982, pp 148 et seq 
(2) and (3) Pierre 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales' pp 25 et seq, ILO, 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1978, Geneva 1979 
(4) Michael Brzoska, Peter Lock, Herbert Wolf; Rustungsproduktion in 
Westeuropa, (Arms production in Western Europe), Hamburg University. 
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story, for they say nothing about the multiplier impact of jobs in one 
industry upon those in another.' (1) But he also notes 'Yet for none of the 
main suppliers do arms exports occupy as important a role in the national 
economy as is often assumed by those who believe that economic imperatives 
must overrule any attempt to restrain arms sales'(1). 
25. In contradiction to the claims made arms exports tie up resources in the 
supplier countries which could be used more effectively and usefully in other 
sectors: arms exports require guarantees, preliminary financing and subsidies 
from the state because most weapons are sold on the world market at below the 
production price and the credit rating of the clients (recipient countries) is 
by no means such that arms can be delivered without state guarantees. This 
also means that safeguarding, Let alone increasing, employment in the 
armaments industry is extremely expensive and with the shortage of public 
financing has to be paid for by unemployment in other sectors of the economy 
in the Member States. A further factor is that with modern, largely 
electronic weapons technology and equipment, the armaments industry is one of 
the most capital-intensive branches of the economy so that subsidies paid to 
this sector have very little effect in terms of creating employment. 
26. Nor is there any justification for the argument that arms supplies to 
foreign countries open up new markets for other products, as it is often the 
case, particularly in the poor and poorest developing countries, that 
financial resources are depleted to such an extent that there is nothing Left 
for other sectors. 
Moreover, countries which adopt a restrictive policy towards arms exports are 
clearly not unable to export other goods. Conversely arms exports by no means 
lead to follow-up deals in other sectors. For example the Federal Republic 
Germany refused to supply the Leopard tank to Iran; instead Iran bought 
British Chieftain tanks. Nevertheless the Federal Republic has received 
several orders for major non-military projects in preference to the country 
(1) Pierre 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales' p 27 _ · 
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which supplied the tanks. In his study, Pierre therefore comes to the 
following conclusions. 'It may be however that the economic importance of 
.1rm~: :;ales - thP 'expl.m.Jtion' most often qivt•n for their existence and 
expansion- is not so great as it is often believed to be. The widespread 
perception that high levels of arms sales are necessary for the national 
economies of the principal suppliers is based upon vague, general notions 
rather than on hard data. Closer investigation, as undertaken on a 
country-by-country basis suggests that the economic benefits are less than is 
generally assumed. Accordingly, limited restraints on sales may have a 
relatively small economic impact.• (1) 
The European trade unions are unequivocally against a policy which sees arms 
exports as a form of labour market policy. They point out that arms exports 
cannot overcome the structural crisis. The European metalworkers.unions 
formulated the following standpoint on the subject of jobs, armaments and arms 
exports (2) : 
'There is hardly any precise information on the effect of employment in 
individual sectors and regions. 
Various studies have however shown that the same resources could be used 
in other sectors to create far more employment. 
Moreover there are a number of examples of the lack of security of 
employment in the arms industries. The fluctuating level of orders for 
the domestic market and the Lack of stability of international markets has 
time and again Lead to major shifts in employment in virtually all sectors 
of the arms industry ••••• ' 
(1) Pierre 'The Global Politics of Arms Sales' p 25 
(2) Joint statement of the European metalworkers unions on restricting arms 
exports of 19 June 1981 
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They suqgest r1mon~1 other thin~1s 
,_ preventing any increase in capacity production as this normally leads to 
greater employment problems; 
refusal to export arms to developing countries and to countries where 
democratic rights are violated. The transfer of large quantities of 
weapons and war material heightens the risk of conflict and threatens 
peace; 
Legal provisions should be introduced or tightened up to control arms 
production, arms exports and the exports of parts, manufacturing equipment 
and expertise; 
controls should be introduced relating to the final destination of weapons 
to prevent re-export; 
export restrictions should also apply to arms produced as part of 
international cooperation; 
a study should be made as to what extent cooperation in the armaments 
industry offers scope for reducing capacity in the interests of the 
employees.' 
The metalworkers unions see the following as possible ways of reducing the 
threat to employment in the existing armaments industry: 
longterm capacity and utilization planning for research, development and 
production which would end the cyclical pattern of ordering : 
regulations on maintaining and increasing the proportion of non-military 
manufacturing; 
gradual changeover from military to non-military production on the basis 
of existing sophisticated technology.' 
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27. One of the arguments often adduced for arms exports is that this helps to 
create regional spheres of influence and offers the recipient countries an 
alternative between the two superpowers. But we have seen in the past that 
the success of this form of 'foreign policy' can be unexpectedly brief, fDr 
example the development between Egypt and its previous supplier, the USSR, and 
the reversal of friendly relations between Iran and the USA as its major 
supplier at the end of the 70's and relations between the USA and Ethiopia in 
the mid 70's. If one considers the situation in the Middle East, a further 
fact becomes obvious : arms supplies to one country may enhance that country's 
security and restore balance,but for another country it can be the cause of 
imbalance and an additional threat which it seeks to offset by renewed efforts 
to import weapons. The country which feels itself at a disadvantage normally 
seeks to obtain comparable weapons from the other superpower. This Leads to a 
further round in the regional arms race and also entails the risk that, should 
a conflict arise, the supplier countries which are represented by advisers and 
technicians and are also under an obligation to provide replacements may 
become involved in the conflict with the danger of the conflict being 
transferred to the alliances. Pierre observes in this connection: 'The 
transfer of arms can go so far as to make the supplier hostage to the 
recipient' and on the subject of the dependence of the recipient country he 
quotes a report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of 1978 on US arms 
supplies to Iran • 'It is not clear who really has influence over whom in 
times of an ambiguous crisis situation.' (1) 
28. Given the wide variety and complex causes for conflicts, which essentially 
however arise f, 1m political, economic, territorial or ideological rivalry, 
there is the danger that it will prove impossible to restrict and control 
._, ·ional conflicts and that these will extend to other regions including the 
European region. 
Since 1945 all conflicts and confrontations involving armed force have taken 
place in countries or regions of the third world with weapons which were 
supplied almost exclusively by the industrialized nations. Exports of arms and 
armaments and the continual updating of equipment neither prevented these wars 
nor did it give the supplier countries control. 
(1) Pierre, op. cit. p. 18 
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(8) Effects on recipient countries 
---------------
29. The burden of the arms race and arms exports and imports are particularly 
prounounced for the recipient countries in the third world and has serious 
consequences. In practically all developing countries this expenditure .. kts 
worse the deprivation and shortages which already exist. Expenditure on 
armaments even prevents developing countries with relatively high earnihgs 
from promoting economic growth and development. Particularly in those 
countries in the third world which do not produce oil military expenditure can 
only be financed at the cost of infrastructure and the satisfaction of basic 
requirements. 'With low production as a result of inadequate resources it is 
only possible to devote a high proportion of national earnings to the military 
sector by cutting back other forms of demand such as private consumption and 
capital formation.' (1). 
30. The unique nature of the highly-sophisticated weapons systems delivered to 
countries in the Third World which increased steadily throughout the 70's mean 
that new forms of dependence from the supplier countries have been created. 
Training and maintenance by specialists from the supplier countries and 
supplies of spare parts at high prices have since become a further additional 
burden on the recipient countries. 
Moreover, unlike in the period following the Second World War, these states no 
longer receive imported weapons as military aid but have to pay for them in 
the same way as normal goods with convertible currency, normally dollars, or 
with strategically important raw materials at severely depressed prices or 
have to use their export earnings from important raw materials for arms. The 
developing countries spend twice as much on arms imports as the industrialized 
nations. (2) Arms imports cost foreign currency irrespective of whether this 
is borrowed or earned and these resources are then no longer available for 
other, non- military purposes. When arms imports are supplied on credit, the 
loans have to be paid back, in some cases at high interest rates. And loans 
granted for the purchase of weapons, unlike those for the purchase of capital 
goods do not enable a country to earn more foreign currency to pay off its old 
debts and further develop its own economy. 
(1) Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, p 112 
(2) SIPRI Annual report 1981/82; Palme report; 
ACDA: World Military and Social Expenditures 1980 
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A further fact is that export earnings in the developing countries are contin-
ually falling and thus many countries have to take up new Loans at higher 
rates of interest on the international capital market with severe social 
consequences. This further hinders growth in the developing countries. 
Between 1977 and 1979, the value of arms imports into oil importing countries 
in the Third World exceeded the sharp rise in the balance of payments 
deficit (1). 
31. Increased military expenditure Leads not only to Lower general 
investments but also to a drop in agricultu~al production: in 69 countries of 
the Third World an increase of 1% GNP for military expenditure Led to an 
average drop in investment of 0.23% and a drop in agriculture of 0.18X. <1> 
These figures show that Limiting arms exports is in the interests not only of 
the supplier and recipient countries but also of world trade as a whole: the 
production anp export of non-military goods is productive, helps to earn 
foreign currency and stimulates demand. 
<1> Lance Taylor: Military Economics in the Third World; Study for the 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
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